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By "historic waters" are usually meant waters which are treated 
as internal waters but which would not have that character were it 
not for the existence of an historic title. 
-The International Court of Justice1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today a world-wide, irreversible enclosure movement is com-
mitted to annexing new sea areas into the territory of coastal states 
or adding them to zones of exclusive state jurisdiction. But the 
movement we can observe in the oceans' commons today is not only 
a decentralized one whereby each state takes what may be per-
mitted (or at least what would not appear to it to be effectively 
prohibited), but also a second, "centralized"2 enclosure movement 
1. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 l.C.J. 116, 130 (Judgment of Dec. 18). 
2. For the descriptive terms "centralized" and "decentralized" enclosures of the 
oceans, see Friedheim, The Political, Economic, and Legal Ocean, in MANAGING OCEAN 
RESOURCES: A PRIMER 26 (Friedheim ed. 1979). He defines "centralized" enclosure as follows: 
Ownership is transferred to the world system under the notion that the oceans 
are the "common heritage of mankind,'' allowing a new comprehensive organiza· 
tion for the management of ocean space, acting as agent for the world community, 
to allocate the permitted uses of ocean space so as to avoid the boom-or-bust ac-
tivity. 
Id. at 36. 
Friedheim defines decentralized enclosure or national enclosure, "a second best solu-
tion,'' as follows: 
The right to allocate which the coastal States have assigned to themselves may 
be used to redistribute wealth only and not create rational management schemes 
2
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limiting high seas freedoms. Be the issues of the centralized 
enclosure as they may ,3 this paper will take up the traditional con-
cept of historic bays as one time-honored basis for asserting national 
claims at the expense of the common high seas, which, however, 
unlike some of the more recent forms of decentralized enclosures, 
purports to rely on, or should rely on, a specific, objective and 
clearly articulated definition, rather than on a Humpty-Dumpty 
subjectivity- as reflected in the following well-known assertion: 
Words mean what I choose them to mean ... Neither more nor 
less ... The question is ... which is to master-that's all.' 
This kind of capriciousness and uncontrolled subjectivity is, 
for example, to be found in the concept, not recognized in interna-
tional law, of "Closed Seas." This writer has written, regarding this 
Soviet concept: 
"Closed Seas." The Soviet Union is known as a state which has 
continuously adhered to the Czarist claim of a territorial sea of 
12 marine miles. Now, when the United States appears to be ready 
to negotiate that claim, another category of exclusive claims has 
arisen over seas which Soviet Russia has inherited from the Czars, 
namely the so-called "closed seas." These would now appear to have 
been left out of the U.S. calculations. It is very hard to pin down 
any exact meaning of this concept, but it would appear to indicate 
that the Soviet Union regards the following seas (and this list is 
neither complete nor closed against the future additions) as inter-
nal waters: the White Sea, the Black Sea, the Kara Sea, the Sea 
of Okhotsk, the Baltic Sea, the Sea of Japan. In these seas, accord-
ing to the Soviet view, only littoral coasts may exercise freedom 
of navigation. This claim is unrecognized by the Family of Nations, 
and the Soviet Union is not pressing it- for the moment. The Arab 
States have sought to adopt this Russian concept to the Gulf of 
Aqaba.5 
In the belief that values of legality and the fulfillment of 
justified expectations arise through the predictability of law, the 
for the resources. It is a system dependent upon drawing borders, but borders 
in the ocean world are still hard to define, draw, and defend .... Finally, national 
enclosure does not handle the question of equity well ... 
Id. 37-38. 
3. Goldie, A Note on Some Diverse Meanings of the "Common Heritage of Mankind," 
10 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 69 (1983). 
4. L. CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass inc. DODGSON, THE ANNOTATED ALICE 269 
(1960) (paraphrased). 
5. Goldie, International Law of the Sea-A Review of States' Offshore Claims and Com-
-petences, 24 NAVAL WAR C. REV., 43, 51 (No. 6 Sequence No. 234, Feb. 1972). 
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paper which follows has been set to the two related tasks of pro-
posing a definition of the traditional legal concept of historic bays 
and of suggesting the advantages of establishing claims, and of 
asserting counterclaims, in terms of this established criterion rather 
than exposing the world's seafaring interests to the indeterminacy 
and capriciousness of emerging, vague and subjectively-oriented 
concepts. 
II. THREE CONFERENCES: 
THREE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
The special legal status of historic bays was recognized in the 
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration of 1910.6 The Tribunal 
stated that "conventions and established usage might be considered 
as the basis for claiming as territorial those bays which on this 
ground might be called historic bays .... " and that "such claims 
should be held valid in the absence of any principle of international 
law on the subject .... "7 The tribunal found that "the more impor~ 
tant bays such as Chaleurs, Conception, and Miramichi"8 should be 
so regarded. In the Fisheries Case9 the International Court of Justice 
unequivocally recognized historic waters as an established category 
of international law as the quotation under the title of this paper 
testifies. The doctrine forming the topic of this paper is thus well 
known to publicists and commentators and has been invoked in 
diplomatic exchanges as a basis of states' claims to exercise a special 
maritime jurisdiction. It has been attested to in decisions of domestic 
courts of the highest reputation, in those of arbitral tribunals and 
in at least one landmark judgment of the International Court of 
Justice. It is thus something of a surprise, perhaps, that the twin 
6. North Atlantic Coast Fisheries (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.) The Hague Arbitration Cases 
134 (Wilson ed. 1915). 
7. Id. at 184. Although the tribunal employed the adjective "territorial" to qualify 
the waters of the relevant historic bays, it is clear from the context that the term was not 
utilized to give those bays the legal status of the territorial sea, since the baselines of the 
true territorial sea were to be drawn at their outer limits, thus distinguishing them from 
the territorial sea properly so-called. Hence the term should be taken to indicate that an 
analogy with land territory and the waters within the boundaries of the state, designating 
the area of its full sovereign authority and competence, is intended. 
8. Id. The tribunal added that Conception Bay should be found to be an historic bay 
as this "was provided for by the decision of the Privy Council in the case of the Direct United 
States Cable Co. v. The Anglo-American Telegraph Co., (1877) L. R. 2 App. Cas. 394 (P.C.) 
in which decision the United States have acquiesced." North Atlantic Coast Fisheries, supra 
note 6, at 188. 
9. Fisheries Case, supra note l, at 116. 
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concepts of historic bays and historic waters were not codified in 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone10 but were only made an exception to the Regime of 
Bays provided in Article 7 of that Convention. Despite the fact that 
publicists have long recognized the legal categories of historic bays 
and, more generally, of historic title in ocean areas other than bays, 
a recent publication of the Law of the Sea Institute of the Univer-
sity of Hawaii entitled Law of the Sea: Neglected Issues11 neglected 
to deal with the Third United Nations Conference's failure to agree 
on a provision defining historic bays and other historic rights and 
their legal scope and operation. This scholarly omission may be con-
trasted with the remarks of Mr. Rubio, representative of Panama 
at the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at 
Geneva, which he uttered at the third meeting of the First Com-
mittee (this was, in fact, the first meeting at which matters of 
substance were discussed). He said, after proposing that the Com-
mittee set up a sub-committee, that: 
The International Law Commission's draft contained only a 
passing reference to historic bays - in article 7, paragraph 4 - but 
the Committee had before it a valuable Secretariat paper 
(A/CO NF .13/1). The question of historic bays was of great impor-
tance, as had been recognized by eminent writers, including 
Bustamente and Gidel. The latter regarded historic bays as a safety 
10. Geneva Convention on the Territoriai Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964) 
[hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea]. 
11. Law of the Sea: Neglected Issues, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE LA w OF THE SEA INSTITUTE 
TWELFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE (J.K. Gamble, Jr. ed.1979). It is of further interest to note that 
Bowen and Friedheim's introduction to the "Stage-Setting Session" entitled Neglected Issues 
at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference," sets forth in Figure 1 ("A Typology 
of UNCLOS Neglect") "three reasons" for the neglect of their seven perceived issues as 
follows: 
Reason for Neglect 
1. Too little known to consider as 
subject of regulation or 
management 
2. Issues too delicate or political 
3. UNCLOS inappropriate forum 
Issues 
• Non-nodule resource recovery 
• Energy Resources beyond 200 
mi. EEZ/margin 
• Polar Regions 
• Military Uses 
•North Sea 
•Airspace 
• Navigation 
Id. at 2, 6. Quite clearly, historic bays do not fit into any of the above three "reasons 
for neglect," although, perhaps, the Conference's failure to agree may have arisen from 
political factors. 
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valve in the law of the sea, and considered that the refusal of States 
to accept the theory would make it impossible to arrive at an agree-
ment on general rules concerning maritime areas. State practice 
in respect of historic bays was equally important; a number of bays 
had been declared "historic" by international treaties or pronounce-
ments of state authorities, and several had been recognized as such 
by arbitral awards.12 
Be the events of the 1958 Conference as they may, the legal 
concept of historic bays was, when at the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea it came up for review, available for 
reconsideration. A renewed possibility of codification one may have 
thought, had become available. The net result was, however, that 
this topic was the subject of only three oblique references in the 
12. Statement of Mr. Rubio, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/1 (1958), reprinted in III UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS, 74 (1958) [hereinafter cited 
as III UNCLOS OFFICIAL RECORDS (1958)). See statements of Mr. Shukairi (Saudi Arabia) id.; 
Mr. Bartos (Yugoslavia) id.; Mr. Martinez-Moreno (El Salvador) id. at 48. Also note the Annex 
to the 21st Meeting Statement by Mr. J.P.A. Francois, Expert to the Secretariat of the 
Conference where he stated (footnotes omitted): 
13. As regards historic bays, the International Law Commission have given 
no definition, for it thought that the concept was familiar to everyone concerned 
with international law. Moreover, historic bays could be defined very satisfactorily 
in the words of the International Court of Justice: "By 'historic waters' are usually 
meant waters which are treated as internal waters but which would not have that 
character were it not for the existence of an historic title." That definition is a 
very innocuous one. If, however, it is desired to go farther and state the condi-
tions which bays must satisfy in order to be considered historic bays, the matter 
becomes much more complicated. It raises the whole problem of acquisition by pre-
scription, and several uncertain points will then have to be cleared up. Is this "con-
tinued and well-established" usage, as the Institute of International Law called 
it in 1894, or "international" usage, as the Institute called it in 1920? Or is it an 
"uncontested" international usage, the word used in the 1928 draft? Must there 
be "established" usage, as the International Law Association's draft of 1926 requires, 
or established usage "generally recognized by nations," as required by the wording 
finally adopted? Can the vital interests of the coastal State be the sole root of a 
right? The 1930 Conference thought that, before beginning to study historic bays, 
it should have before it information from all the States on the bays which they 
claimed to be historic and the reasons for their claims. 
14. The Secretariat's excellent memorandum [A/CONF.13/1) does not provide 
us with the material needed for a thorough study of this question. I therefore do 
not think it would be of any use to set up a sub-committee for that purpose, as 
proposed by the delegation of Panama [3rd meeting]. In my opinion, the Conference 
might merely use the term "historic bays" and leave it to be construed, in case 
of dispute, by the Court, with due regard for all the features of the special case, 
which could not possibly be provided for in a general rule. If necessary, the Inter-
national Law Commission could be instructed to study acquisition by prescription, 
with special reference to historic bays. 
Id., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C, L.10 (1958), at 69. 
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982:13 Article 
10(6) provides that the twenty-four mile closing straight baseline 
of bays does "not apply to so-called 'historic bays' .... "14; Article 
15 which recognizes the existence of historic title to waters by 
excluding such waters from the operation of the equidistance rule 
for which the Article provides, in the absence of agreement, for 
the delimitation of the territorial seas between adjacent and opposite 
states.148 Historic waters are again recognized in Article 298(1) which 
provides states parties with the capacity to invoke "optional ex-
ceptions to the applicability of Section 2" (which establishes com-
pulsory dispute settlement procedures entailing binding decisions), 
including disputes "involving historic bays or titles." This "optional 
exception" may be invoked by a party to the treaty by making a 
written declaration. On the other hand, alternative dispute settle-
ment procedures become incumbent upon the parties where "no 
13. Third United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprint,ed in 21I.L.M.1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited 
as 1982 Convention]. 
14. Id. art. 10(6). This formula for avoiding definition in Article 10(6) namely the 
reference to "so-called 'historic' bays" (note the inverted commas around the qualifier 
"historic"), was taken from Article 7(6) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 10, and further back the Inter-American Council of 
Jurists, "Principles of Mexico on the Juridical Regime of the Sea," approved at the Fourth 
Plenary Session, February 3, 1956, which provided (as far as historic bays are concerned): 
E. 
Bays 
5. So-called "historic bays" shall be subject to the regime of international waters 
of the coastal state or states. McChesney, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW "BLUE BOOK" 246 (1957). Pan-American Union Doc. CIJ-29 at 38 
(English). 
The formula "so-called 'historic' bays" in the "Principles of Mexico" and the 1958 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone regarding historic bays 
was carried through into the drafts of the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea. See, e.g. Statement of Activities of the Conference During its 
First and Second Sessions, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L. 8/REV. l, Annex II, Appendix 
I. 3 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 
110, U.N. Sales No.: E.75. V.5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 3 UNCLOS III OFFICIAL 
RECORDS (1975)) for the following formulations: 
Provision 17 
Formula A 
The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays or in any case 
where the straight baseline system provided for in article ... is applied. 
Formula B 
In the absence of other applicable rules the baselines of the territorial sea are 
measured from the outer limits of historic bays or other historic waters. 
14a. 1982 Convention, supra note 13, art. 15. 
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agreement within a reasonable period of time is reached in negotia-
tions between the parties."14b 
The reason for the two applicable United Nations-sponsored 
international conventions (which were drafted with a view to the 
codification of the relevant rules of the international law of the sea), 
so signally failing to define the concept of historic bays, prescribe 
how they may be acquired and determine the rights and duties 
entailed, can be found in the United Nations International Law Com-
mission's sense of indefiniteness when the need arose for the 
formulation of the specific concept. It was also confronted by a 
difficulty in reaching a consensus for casting into binding, indeed 
mandatory language, the specific international law rules govern-
ing the topic. The Commission was, furthermore, confronted by 
political problems which could not be resolved by the purely 
juridical considerations informing the studies which the United 
Nations Secretariat had prepared on the subject15 or by other 
entirely objective and equally excellent scientific expositions. While 
these products of the study might provide guides to the strictly 
legal issues, they were not capable of settling the rivalries which 
would have been exacerbated by providing any form of words with 
the authority of a code. Thus, the International Law Commission 
and the two Conferences were unable to strike a satisfactory balance 
between the interests of states with authentic claims to adjacent 
sea areas based on long usage, and those of states that opposed 
particular claims to historic bays which their neighbors asserted, 
or states that in general imposed strict standards for the recogni-
tion of historic rights in order to vindicate the freedom of the seas 
and oppose, as a matter of principle, the facilitation of enclosures 
in ocean regions.16 
14b. Id. art. 298(1). 
15. These studies were: (1) Historic Bays: Memorandum by the Secretariat of the United 
Nations (Preparatory Document, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/1 (1957), reprinted in I UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 1 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/37, 
U.N. Sales No. 58.V4, vol. 1 (1959) [hereinafter cited as I UNCLOS OFFICIAL RECORDS (1957)]. 
(2) United Nations Secretariat, Juridical Regimes of Historic Waters Including Historic Bays, 
U.N. Doc. A!CN. 4/143 (9 March 1962), (1962] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N. 1 (1964). 
16. There would appear to be a similar dearth of attempts at codifying this concept 
by private scholars and organizations. True, one may find oblique references such as the 
following: 
Quant aux baies, y compris les embouchures des grands fleuves et aux fjords 
ainsi qu'aux parties de la mer enfermees par des iles et des ilots, c'est une ques-
tion d' histoires de savoir jusqu'a quelle mesure ils auront ete occupes par l'etat 
riverain: car ii s'agit la vraiment de parcelles de la mer faisant partie integrante 
du crops de l'etat. 
RAESTAD. LA MER TERRITORIALE 171 (1913). 
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Again, while the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea finally failed to come up with a definitive and substan-
tive article on historic bays, the topic was actively canvassed at 
the Caracas (Second) Session of the Conference. For example, Mr. 
Herrera Caceras (Honduras) observed, after noting that his coun-
try was : not a party to any of the Geneva (1958 Law of the Sea) 
Conventions, that: 
Honduras was one of three coastal States bordering on the 
Gulf of Fonseca in the Pacific Ocean. That gulf was regulated 
exclusively by existing delimitations and agreements between the 
coastal States. The legal concept contained in article 7 of the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
would be applicable to that bay but for the exception laid down 
in that article, i.e., that it related only "to bays the coasts of which 
belong to a single State" and that it would not apply to so-called 
"historic" bays. He regarded the latter provision as open to objec-
tion because of its discriminatory nature. It was discriminatory 
to exclude bays which bordered the coasts of various States when, 
as in the present case, all the coastal States maintained that the 
waters of the bay were internal. Although there was no established 
legal norm, the status of that bay had been accepted by the coastal 
States. It had never been maintained that the entrance to the Gulf 
of Fonseca was an international strait, which showed that the legal 
unity of all parts of the bay was generally accepted. Moreover, 
there was no valid reason for excluding from the legal concept of 
bays the so-called "historic" bays in cases where the concept 
applied to them. His delegation therefore maintained that the tradi-
tional concept of "historic" bays should be revised because it had 
been elaborated in response to a former need for a legal defini-
tion of bays under the exclusive competence of the coastal State.17 
In addition, the Philippines representative, Mr. Abad Santos, 
criticised the United Kingdom's draft articles on the territorial sea,18 
his grounds being that it made no mention of the impact on the 
territorial sea of historic bays.19 At the next meeting, however, Mr. 
17. Statement of Mr. Herrera Caceras, II THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE 
LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 100-01(1974) (hereinafter cited as II UN CLOS III OFFICIAL 
RECORDS (1974)). 
18. United Kingdom: draft articles on the Territorial Sea and Straights, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 62/C.2/L.3 (1974), reprinted in III THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW 
OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 183 (197 4) [hereinafter cited as III UN CLOS III OFFICIAL RECORDS 
(1974)). 
19. Statement of Mr. Abad Santos, reprinted in II UNCLOS III OFFICIAL RECORDS 
(1974), supra note 17, at 102-03. 
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Galindo Pohl (El Salvador) attacked Mr. Herrera Caceras's presen-
tation, and raised the question whether "it was in order to discuss 
bilateral issues." He saw the purpose of the debate as fulfilling "the 
task of preparing general rules which would subsequently serve 
as the basis for settling specific cases."20 Be that as it may, the 
representative of Guatemala (also a coastal state of the Gulf of 
Fonseca), Mr. Santiso Galvez, was reported in the following terms: 
"Finally, he wished to take the opportunity to repeat that the waters 
of the historic Bay of Amatique were internal waters, and always 
had been under the sovereignty of Guatemala."21 
But the dispute did not end with the intervention of the third 
state-one interested in the status of the Gulf of Fonseca. Both Mr. 
Herrera Caceras and Mr. Galindo Pohl had further comments to 
make at this same fourth meeting. In brief, the three represen-
tatives agreed, in effect, that a dispute over the Gulf existed 
between the three littoral countries22 -Nicaragua, Honduras and 
El Salvador. Thus, after two studies by the United Nations 
Secretariat and three United Nations Conferences on the Law of 
the Sea, the world seems as far as ever from finding a universally 
acceptable definition of the concept. It is, therefore, necessary to 
turn from asking why this should be so to an inquiry _whether the 
legal doctrine may be the subject of a general definition and, if not, 
whether there is, in fact, validity to claims such as those of the 
United States in terms of the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays on 
grounds of historic title, or whether alternative bases of sovereignty 
and authority over them exjst, and have existed from the earliest 
times of this country's nationhood, or whether changes in United 
States policy have dictated changes in characterizing the legal bases 
for asserting territorial sovereignty over these reaches of internal 
waters. 
III. BASIC ISSUES 
In understanding the strange opposition between the writers 
and the case law on the one hand, and the codification conferences 
on the other, it is necessary to begin the requisite analytical review 
by presenting the basic notions which publicists, judges and 
arbitrators have canvassed on the general question of historic bays. 
20. Id. at 104. 
21. Id. at 106. 
22. Id. at 108. Other representatives who canvassed ideas on historic bays included 
Mr. Abad Santos (Philippines). Id. at 111. 
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As with all historic titles, whether by occupatio rei nullius, or alter-
natively by prescription good against the world community, there 
must be an effective exercise of sovereign~y over the area in ques-
tion. Secondly, the claim must be acquiesced in, or recognized, or 
perhaps just tolerated by the world community. (There is debate 
on this point with regard to the degree of non-opposition.) Thirdly, 
there is the challenging question of the effectiveness of control. This 
element is a variable one. Fourthly, this paper will examine the 
kind of rights that the coastal state may demand over these sea 
areas, and so may assert against all other states. Having raised 
these elementary points, the discussion will then touch on the ques-
tion of the relevance, which some scholars and states assert, of the 
vital interests of the coastal state to the acquisition of historic titles 
over bays and other maritime areas. Fifthly, the question of time 
is important: both with regard to periods of time and the frequency 
of the sovereign acts of the coastal state. Sixthly, some thoughts 
will be tentatively offered regarding the burden of proof. Then, 
finally, after this groundwork has been laid, the initial question will 
be raised once again, namely, whether a comprehensive formula-
tion governing historic bays in general is practicable; in the sense 
of being acceptable to the world community. 
IV. EFFECTIVENESS, 
ACQUIESCENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY 
In international law, as in all legal systems, effectiveness is 
an essential element. Indeed the existence of the state itself is deter-
mined by the effectiveness of its capacity to exercise and display 
its authority and maintain its sovereign independence as a state 
over its territory and population. But effectiveness itself is a doc-
trine which confronts, in dialectical opposition, the old legal Latin 
maxim ex injuria non oritur jus with its Latin negation and the 
lawyer's morally jejune tag factus facit jus. These two concepts are 
contradictory, yet their dialectical interaction over time provides 
the stuff out of which law and legal rights grow. Emphasis on one, 
so as to deny validity to the other, is, I strongly suggest, only 
stressed by authorities who wish to develop a theory of law based 
exclusively on the former (utopianism) or the latter (Hobbesian 
power) rather than accept their dynamic interaction. Obviously if 
one asserts that ex in}uria non oritur jus provides a fundamental 
rule of law, the premise of an argument that prescriptive rights 
may not be legally obtained is laid. The claims of an individual, a 
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neighbor or a group of neighboring states to prescriptive rights 
arise out of an initial inJuria or a wrongful act. Again, we know 
that we should not accept wrongful acts as destructive of rights 
which are to be protected under the United Nations Charter-
especially when those wrongful acts establish new rights for which 
the protection of the Charter is claimed. But such an argument flies 
in the face of legal history and all experience. It is here that the 
issue of acquiescence becomes important. When the community of 
states acquiesces in the assertion of claims, because the assertion 
is at a minimal cost to the world community's rights such as, for 
example, a claim that a bay in a distant ocean without traffic is 
an historic bay, the balance of convenience and equity favors the 
enclosure. (Spencer's Gulf in Australia may provide one example; 
Hudson's Bay in the Canadian Arctic may provide another.) Yet 
when the "injuria" is great enough, it is assumed there will be non-
acquiescence. But where acquiescence is found to exist, despite the 
"injuria," title usually depends on the degree of "injuria" in 
counterpoint to the level of the cost of acquiescence. Effectiveness 
thus provides the political test for the validity of legal rights. 
Is acquiescence an essential element to the formulation of 
historic title and rights? Some writers tell us yes, on the other hand, 
the majority of the International Court of Justice, in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, said that it was enough that the 
Norwegian baseline claims were tolerated. 23 Toleration is not 
acquiescence. It implies a far less exacting standard. Simply to do 
nothing may not be acquiescence. Non-reaction can be (and was in 
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case) taken as tolerance. This obser-
vation gives rise to a further test. Lawyers all know that equity 
frowns on the abuse of faith. A claim based on a failure to respect 
the equity of reliance is generally labeled "injurious reliance." 
Where a state in international law, or a person in private law, "has 
slept on their rights" and has allowed another person to act on the 
assumption that a certain condition of fact exists, and the other 
person has so acted upon perceiving and being encouraged by the 
silence of the first, then that first person cannot later, when the 
second person has altered his or its position relying on that silence, 
turn around and demand that the acts done (with its silent tolerance) 
be undone, or form the basis of a claim of injury. Underlying the 
23. Fisheries Case, supa note 1, at 138: "The general toleration of foreign states with 
regard to the Norwegian practice is an unchallenged fact." See also id. at 139: "the general 
toleration of international community." 
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verbal debate about · tolerance, as used in the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case, and acquiescence, which we find in most of the 
publicists, there is the value judgment that a state should not be 
permitted to allow a situation to continue once it has decided that 
such a state of affairs is contrary to its legally protected interests 
and, as such, should form the basis of a timely protest. Tolerance 
is thus a failure to protest against a known state of affairs, not-
withstanding the injured state's appraisal of the potential effec-
tiveness, or ineffectiveness of making such a protest. 
An effective protest must be strongly made. A pro forrna or 
paper protest is not enough. It should be emphatic and point to the 
rights invaded in no uncertain or ambiguous terms and, if necessary, 
be insistently repeated so as to lead to negotiations, or, in the alter-
native, to induce the characterization of the other state's conduct 
as intractably unreasonable or even as aggressive. Otherwise, a sim-
ple paper protest establishes no more than an adverseness of the 
claimant state's assertion of right to the protesting state. This, of 
course, may strengthen, rather than undermine, the adverse claim, 
for a paper protest provides an insufficient basis for protecting a 
valid legal right constituting part of the status quo. It is also insuf-
ficient for demanding, effectively, a halt to the process of the crea-
tion of an adverse historic right. Finally, in the context of 
acquiescence and tolerance, the question of recognition arises. While 
the recognition of a right may provide a reinforcement for the 
establishment of a right, its converse, namely the refusal of recogni-
tion, may provide a very feeble obstacle to the process of claim 
whereby a coastal state accumulates instances for asserting a right, 
for example, to an historic bay. The simple refusal of recognition 
could be ineffective to half the ongoing and cumulative process of 
the historic consolidation of title if, under the Fisheries Case ruling, 
tolerance is enough; a state may and often does, in effect, tolerate 
a situation it does not recognize. Indeed the court's view of the 
British inaction with regard to Norway's fisheries claims and those 
rights' assertion through the Royal Decrees illustrates this 
distinction. 
Is prescription relevant to claiming historic bays? Professor 
D.H.N. Johnson, amongst other writers, has asserted that a historic 
bay can only be lawfully acquired by a coastal state by means of 
the application of international rules of acquisitive prescription.24 
24. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.1950 
332 (1951); Johnson, Consolidation as a Root of Title in International Law, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
215 (1955). 
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In Professor Johnson's view, moreover, the prescription which is 
essential in such cases is not a prescriptive right against one or 
two neighboring states, but one good against the world community. 
Starting from the point that the high seas are free, we must 
necessarily be talking about a world community right to exercise 
the freedom of the high seas in the sense of all nations' free access 
to use it as a spatial resource for transportation and to gather its 
other resources. Professor Johnson sees the high seas, in addition, 
as a commons whose common resources may be individually 
exploited in common. The establishment of rights inconsistent with 
these world community rights can only be effectuated, according 
to Johnson, by means of the satisfaction of the hard requirements 
of a prescription good against the whole world. Professor Johnson's 
thesis is criticised, although not in name, in the United Nations Study 
on Historic Bays. This latter study points out~ quite correctly it is 
suggested, that in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case the idea of 
acquisitive prescription was rejected, in effect, by the International 
Court. One relevant Norwegian interpretation (and many other 
states' interpretation as well) of the judgment was that the 
Norwegian claims had survived as a limited residue from the age 
of mare clausum when the Dano-Norwegian kings clai_med the so-
called Norwegian Sea as being subject to their sovereignty, and 
that the historic right therefore had nothing to do with prescrip-
tion, but was simply the consolidation of shrunken rights which had 
been maintained over the centuries, and were finally enunciated 
in the Royal Decrees of 1935. These ancient claims, so this argu-
ment runs, residually survive as Norway's rights over the waters 
enclosed by her Skerryguard. 
It is also true to say that there are other bays or historic waters 
in the world, apart from the coastal waters of Norway, where the 
coastal state's jurisdiction may be seen as pre-dating the arrival 
and supremacy of the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas. 
Examples include the traditional exercise of sovereignty over the 
Gulf of Manaar and Palk's Bay between India and Ceylon. Both of 
these have, from ancient times, been treated as subject to the 
sovereignty of the rulers of Ceylon, now Sri Lanka.25 Today Sri 
Lanka claims those bays as the successor to the British Raj which, 
in its turn, claimed those bays as enclosed waters by virtue of being 
25. See Ceylon Ordinance No. 6 of 1933, 4 CEYLON LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS ch. 168 
(1938). Annakumaru Pillai v. Muthupayal, 28 INDIAN L. REV. 551 (1904). 
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the successor to the Dutch, the Portuguese and the ancient kings 
of the island who had, since time immemorial, exercised sovereignty 
and authority over the pearl fisheries of those enclosed waters. It 
is also true to say that in a number of other maritime areas similar 
rights have survived from the earlier periods of the history of 
international law. For example, certain rights to particular seden-
tary fisheries (coral and sponge) in the southern Mediterranean have 
fallen under the historic rights of such coastal states as Tunisia, 
Libya and Egypt. These may be seen as having come down to the 
present as survivals of the rights asserted by the rulers of those 
states under Islamic law. Pre-dating contemporary public interna-
tional law, they have little or nothing to do with our ideas of the 
Roman law rights upon which Hugo Grotius and his contemporaries 
and followers relied when they acclaimed it as raJio serif.pa.. Nor 
did the evolution of the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas 
amongst Western European states have a similar impact upon these 
Buddhist, Islamic, and other non-Western states so as to limit or 
restrict their earlier extensive maritime rights. 
In light of the foregoing, it seems feasible to observe that 
historic bays stem from a number of separate theories of law. One, 
indeed, is their creation alternatively either by way of a prescrip-
tive right or by the tolerance of other states. This assertion can 
more confidently be made with regard to historic bays in Europe 
and in North America and especially the Bay of Granville (Cancalc) 
off the coasts of Brittany and Normandy, Conception Bay in North 
America, as well as many others. Their status as historic bays may 
be seen as the product of historic rights. It is not, however, of 
universal significance. What may be true of the Bay of Cancale may 
not necessarily be true of the Gulf of Manaar. It is also not true 
of bays whose coastal states may assert historic title over them 
on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, and whose title 
may stem from a different legal regime (that of Islam) from that 
of a purely European provenance. 
Having referred, briefly, to historic maritime rights existing 
under different historical regimes (namely those derived from Islam) 
on the African coasts of the Mediterranean, a further clarification 
becomes necessary. At the moment the evidence has not been 
presented which would establish the Gulf of Sirte as an historic 
bay. Furthermore, aerial and naval incidents of the recent past. 
indicate that any such claim has not been tolerated by stah~s which 
are prepared to vindicate their rights of free navigation on the free 
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high seas. But, on the other hand, the Libyan claim to the Gulf of 
Sirte could be an interesting subject of study. It would be 
interesting because, while the policy and authority of the Kingdom 
of Italy during the period when Libya was subject to the 
sovereignty of that state would be relevant, it would not be con-
clusive. On the other hand, evidence of state practice stemming from 
the policies of rulers in the pre-colonial era may well be more 
effective, provided a record of these could be substantiated. 
More generally, a decolonization argument, rejecting colonial 
power's policies, furthermore, could, indeed, be formulated so as 
to assert that a colonial power should not be able to terminate, for 
the indefinite future, and for purpose of its own interests, the rights 
of the colonized community or state which has fallen under its 
sovereignty. There is some truth in this, but such an argument 
would, of course, still have to look at the evidence about whether 
Italy asserted, or negotiated away, for its own interests, a pre-
existing historic right. Secondly, it should be asked whether the 
historic right now asserted over the Gulf of Sirte ever existed under 
Islamic law in the first place. On the basis of insufficient evidence, 
perhaps, and before ever having had the opportunity to study the 
history of the Gulf of Sirte, it is highly probable that historic rights 
never were effectively consolidated under Islamic law. So, possibly, 
Italy never believed that she could assert a lawful claim to the Gulf 
of Sirte as an historic bay. This is distinguishable from the legal 
character of certain other smaller bays of North Africa, especially 
those on the Tunisian coast, where fishing by means of traps, sponge 
fisheries and shell fisheries of sea-bottom creatures of all kinds have 
been strictly regulated. These sea areas bear analogies with the 
pearl fisheries in the Persian Gulf which have been, since time 
immemorial, strictly regulated by the coastal prince or sovereign. 
V. THE "VITAL INTERESTS" OF THE COASTAL STATE 
Some writers have asserted that the establishment of historic 
rights over bays and offshore waters may arise from the vital in-
terests of the coastal state. Can, for example, an historic bay be 
created by means of asserting that to exercise sovereign power over 
the bay is of vital interest to the coastal state? We come here to 
the assertion that vital interests can create historic title. 
At the First Codification Conference of 1930 at The Hague, for 
example, the Portuguese representative stated the following point 
of view: 
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From a variety of circumstances, the state to which the bay belongs 
finds it necessary to exercise full sovereignty over it without 
restriction or hindrance. The considerations which justify their 
claim are security and defense of the land territory and ports, and 
the well-being and even existence of the state.26 
227 
The present government of the Libyan Peoples Arab 
Jamahirayah has, as a result of United States Navy exercises, 
asserted that ~he Gulf of Sirte is an historic bay. By this means 
Libya has claimed to enclose it in order to bring it within its 
domestic territorial jurisdiction. The argument adduced in support 
of this assertion is that the Gulfs incorporation represents an essen-
tially vital interest of Libya. 
The argument that the vital interests of the coastal state should 
also provide a basis for enclosing a bay within the territory of the 
coastal state and for, further, classing it as "historic" was first put 
forward by Dr. Drago, the famous Argentinian international lawyer 
of the pre-World War I era. He argued that such great river 
estuaries as the Rio de la Plata and the mouths of the Orinoco and 
the Amazon should be regarded as historic bays of the Latin coun-
tries from whose shores those rivers debouch,27 on the ground that 
to find otherwise would be unfair to newly decolonized states. 
(Incidentally, in saying these words with regard to Latin America, 
Dr. Drago was employing contemporary language long before the 
present age of decolonization.) It is true to say, whatever other 
justification a coastal state may give in terms of its vital interests 
for enclosing such bays within its sovereign territory, the features 
should not be called historic bays. To label them so does unnecessary 
violence to the requirement that this characterization must have 
a meaningful basis in history. History does not spring like Pallas 
Athena fully armed, and complete, from the head of Jove. Nor can 
an interest be based both on arguments of historic development 
and on criteria which have no relevant need for a time dimension. 
Rather, an historic title unrolls, evolves, and is consolidated. 
Accordingly, to try to fit such claims as Dr. Drago's vital interests 
argument and indeed, those of the Portuguese government at The 
26. Statement by the Portuguese government at the First Codification Conference 
at The Hague, League of Nations Doc. C. 74. M.39.1919V, at 184. 
27. See, e.g., Judge Drago's dissent in Proceedings in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries 
Arbitration, S. Doc. No. 870, 61st Cong., 3rd Sess. 519 (1912) [hereinafter cited as North Atlan-
tic Coast Fisheries Arbitration); Brierly, Vital Interests and the Law, 21 BRIT. Y .B. INT'L L. 
51 (1944). 
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Hague Codification Conference of 1930 (which again raised the issues 
of vital interest being a basis for asserting historic bays)28 should 
be sympathetically turned aside as contradictory of the essential 
meaning of the term "historic bays." It emphatically negates the 
unfolding and consolidating elements of the concept. Hence language 
and definition, authority and justice effectively negate any historic 
claim to enclose a sea area merely on the premise of the vital 
interests of the coastal state while, of course, vital interests may, 
on other grounds strongly justify the establishment of some kind 
of maritime protective jurisdiction. Alternative justifications should 
be established which do not do violence to the very name and 
category of an historic bay. Surely if a claim is asserted for the 
purpose of defense, or for obtaining exclusive control of valuable 
offshore resources, vital interests may today well vindicate claims 
under alternative legal concepts to that of historic bays. 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
long before December 1982 (when the Convention was accepted by 
the great majority of negotiating states) had, for example, already 
accepted the theory of archipelagic waters. Today few people would 
deny that an emerging customary international law rule, which is 
in the process of ascribing their archipelagic waters to island states, 
is unfolding before our very eyes. Then again, the twenty-four mile 
closing line for bays has come to be accepted as part of general 
international law. This may seem a modest closing line to many, 
but in the early days of this century it would have been regarded 
as the greatest extravagance. At that time the closing line of bays 
was widely held to be limited to double the distance of the breadth 
of the territorial sea- no more than six miles. Then again, and par-
ticularly with regard to vitally needed offshore fisheries such as 
those asserted by Chile, Ecuador and Peru in regard to the 
resources of the Humboldt Current, an alternative regime to that 
of historic bays is called into play to protect exclusive claims. Today 
we also hear of the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Surely this 
constitutes a far more generous recognition of the vital interests 
of the coastal state in a maritime region than the concept of historic 
bays? Then again on the issue of defense, surely, we cannot leave 
out of consideration the whole system of air traffic control and the 
authority over approaching aircraft in terms of what is called, in 
the United States, the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). This 
28. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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reaches a distance of 500-miles off the East and West Coasts of 
America. Similarly, national interests are protected by the so-called 
Dew Line combining the security interests of Canada and the United 
States with regard to the Arctic. In this context, it should be noted 
that no state has protested against the exercise of authority in the 
ADIZ. Parallels of these assertions of national authority to vindicate 
the national security of the coastal state are to be found on every 
continent. In fact, every developing and developed state today is 
not only entitled to exercise such power, but has a duty to engage 
in air traffic control to maintain international air traffic safety when 
aircraft approach its shores, otherwise there would be worse air 
traffic congestion and greater risk of catastrophic accidents than 
we would ever experience on the crowded highways of Europe and 
North America. Before focusing attention onto historic bays for the 
protection of vital interests, policy makers might do well to 
remember that there are other and possibly more functional con-
cepts available for the protection of vital interests without making 
a fiction of history or a distortion of the past. 
VI. FIVE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since 1945 a considerable volume of litigation has taken place 
regarding the delimitation, inter se, of the offshore continental shelf 
areas appertaining to the United States. The first round of 
litigation29 chiefly involved domestic constitutional law rather than 
public international law questions, and in the three cases that these 
issues arose, the Supreme Court of the United States found that 
the United States, rather than the littoral states, had gained 
dominion and control over the seabed and subsoil of the three-mile 
territorial belt (except in the case of United States v. Louisiana30 
where the state's claim had been to a twenty-seven mile belt). As 
29. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 
699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). 
30. 339 U.S. 699. This claim of land underlying a three leagues belt of territorial sea 
was reiterated in United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 364 U.S. 856 (1960), 
modified, 382 U.S. 288 (1965), but only vindicated for the seaward boundaries of Texas, 
Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi. In United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960), the 
Supreme Court found that the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted Florida a three marine-
league belt of land under the Gulf of Mexico lying seaward of its coastline. But this Spanish 
measurement giving additional breadth to the territorial sea did not apply to the waters 
of Florida's Atlantic coast. 
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Justice Douglas pointed out in United States v. California: "Not only 
has acquisition, as it were, of the three-mile belt been accomplished 
by the National Government, but protection and control of it has 
been and is a function of external sovereignty."31 
B. THE SUBMERGED LANDS ACT 
As a result of the holdings of the Supreme Court in the 
California, Louisiana, and Texas cases, the Congress enacted the 
Submerged Lands Act in 195332 that "quit-claimed" and "released" 
to the states all rights to lands beneath navigable waters out to 
the outer limits of the three-mile marginal sea or, with regard to 
the states bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, to their outer boun-
daries if more than three miles offshore. 
With regard to historic bays, there is no express mention in 
the Act, as finally passed, of these legal entities, although earlier 
versions of the bill did mention them. In the Act, Section 2(c) defines 
"coast line" as "the line of ordinary low water along that portion 
of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the 
line marking the seaward limit of inland waters."33 It should be noted 
that in the first draft of the bill inland waters were defined as 
including: "all estuaries, ports, harbors, bays, channels, straits, 
historic bays, and sounds, and all other bodies of water which join 
the open sea." 
But this definition was removed by the Senate Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs. 34 In United States v. California, 
moreover, the Supreme Court observed that the above definition 
was eliminated "on grounds that it would prejudice and limit the 
position which the United States could take in its future conduct 
of foreign affairs."35 
After the enactment of the Submerged Lands Act, and apart 
from one lawsuit which was brought by states lacking a coastline 
and hence the possibility of benefiting from the Act and which 
attacked the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that ceding 
31. 332 U.S. at 38. 
32. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. SS 1301-15 (1982). See also The Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. SS 1331-46 (1982), which provided for the jurisdic-
tion of the United States over the "Outer Continental Shelf' (defined as areas seaward of 
those "quitclaimed" to the states by the Submerged Lands Act) and authorized the Secretary 
of the Interior to lease such areas for exploration and exploitation purposes. 
33. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, S 2(c), 43 U.S.C. S 1301 (1982). 
34. S. REP. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., at 18. 
35. 381 u .s. 139, 151 (1965). 
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the submerged lands to individual states would take away the "equal 
footing" among states by extending state power into the domain 
of federal responsibility ,36 litigation was between the coastal states 
benefiting from the Act and the United States. This litigation fell 
into two categories: (1) disputes as to the width of the quitclaimed 
lands under the marginal sea37 in the Gulf of Mexico; and (2) the 
definition of the baselines from which the territorial sea and, hence, 
the lands included within the Submerged Lands Act's "quitclaim" 
should be measured. While the disputes with respect to the width 
of the coastal state's territorial sea do not include historic bays 
issues, those involving baselines do. In this respect five cases are 
of interest, namely: United States v. California,38 United States v. 
Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case},39 United States v. Florida,40 
United States v. Maine,41 United States v. Alaska.42 
C. AN OUTLINE OF THE FIVE SUBMERGED LANDS CASES 
RELATING TO HISTORIC BAYS AND HISTORIC WATERS 
At the outset it should be noted that, in the first of these five 
cases (namely United States v. California43), the Supreme Court held 
that "Congress, in passing the Act, left the responsibility for defin-
ing inland waters to this Court. We think that it did not tie our 
hands at the same time."44 This thesis was predicated on the more 
36. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 274 (1954) (Reed, J., concurring). 
37. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. at 1. It should be noted that in this case Justice 
Harlan observed, for the Court, that "there is no question of Congress' power to fix state 
land and water boundaries as a domestic matter." Id. at 35. See also United States v. Loui-
siana, 389 U.S. 155 (1967), reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 1059 (1968) in which the State of Texas claimed 
that the baselines of its three-league territorial sea should be measured from the seaward 
edge of artificial jetties. Under this argument the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 would be 
seen to quitclaim, to the State of Texas, the submerged lands lying more than three leagues 
from those jetties (as well as three leagues from the shoreline where the jetties do not create 
the greater belt of quitclaimed submerged lands). The argument failed. The Supreme Court 
held that the three-league belt must be measured by the boundary which existed in 1845, 
when Texas was admitted to the Union, and not from the jetties which were built long 
thereafter. 
38. U.S. v. California, 381U.S.139, reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 889 (1965), modified, 382 U.S. 
448, (1966), modified, 432 U.S. 40 (1977). 
39. U.S. v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 994, modified, 394 U.S. 1, 
modified, 394 U.S. 836 (1969). 
40. U.S. v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975). 
41. U.S. v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975). 
42. U.S. v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 885, on remand, 519 F.2d 1376 
(1975). 
43. 381 U.S. at 139. 
44. Id. at 164, 150-51. 
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general foundation of the separation of powers. In the 1960 United 
States v. Louisiana case the Court had said: 
The power to admit new states resides in Congress. The Presi-
dent, on the other hand, is the constitutional representative of the 
United States in its dealings with foreign nations. From the former 
springs the power to establish state boundaries; from the latter 
comes the power to determine how far this country will claim ter-
ritorial rights in the marginal sea as against other nations. Any 
such determination is, of course, binding on the states. The exer-
cise of Congress' power to admit new states, while it may have 
international consequences, also entails consequences as between 
Nation and State. We need not decide whether action by Congress 
fixing a state's territorial boundary more than three miles beyond 
its coast constitutes an overriding determination that the state, 
and therefore this country, are to claim that much territory against 
foreign nations. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that 
there is no question of Congress' power to fix state land and water 
boundaries as a domestic matter. Such a boundary, fully effective 
as between Nation and State, undoubtedly circumscribes the 
extent of navigable inland.waters and underlying lands owned by 
the state under the Pollard rule. Were that rule applicable also 
to the marginal sea- the premise on which Congress proceeded 
in enacting the Submerged Lands Act-it is clear that such a boun-
dary would be similarly effective to circumscribe the extent of 
submerged lands beyond low-water mark, and within the limits of 
the Continental Shelf, owned by the state. For, as the Government 
readily concedes, the right to exercise jurisdiction and control over 
the seabed and subsoil of the Continental Shelf is not 
internationally restricted by the limit of territorial waters. 
We conclude that, consonant with the purpose of Congress 
to grant to the states, subject to the three-league limitation, the 
lands they would have owned had the Pollard rule been held 
applicable to the marginal sea, a state territorial boundary beyond 
three miles is established for purposes of the Submerged Lands 
Act by Congressional action so fixing it, irrespective of the limit 
of territorial waters.45 
But while the Court left to the United States complete discre-
tion in deciding whether or not to extend its boundaries to the fur-
thest extent permitted under international law, it saw, in United 
States v. California,46 a partial exception to that proposition with 
45. See Louisiana, 363 U.S. at 35-36. 
46. 381 U.S. at 139. 
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regard to historic bays. It observed that there could be situations 
where a United States title to a bay would not "be decisive in all 
circumstances, for a case might arise in which the historic title was 
clear beyond doubt."'7 
1. United States v. California'8 
In the first case relating to offshore submerged lands, which 
had been decided in 1947,'9 the decision related to the ownership, 
under the Constitution of the United States, of those lands. This 
second case sought the interpretation of the relevant provisions 
of the Submerged Lands Act and, in .particular, the meaning of the 
term "inland waters." California claimed, as historic waters (bays) 
of the state, the following sea areas: 
(1) Crescent City Bay 
(2) Monterey Bay50 
(3) San Luis Obispo Bay 
(4) Santa Monica Bay51 
(5) San Pedro Bay52 
(6) Newport Bay 
California also claimed the following expanses of the Pacific 
Ocean as "inland" (internal) waters of the State, on the precedent 
of the Norwegian Fisheries Case53 and the authority of Article 4 
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 54 The 
latter provides for the use of straight baselines if the "coast line 
is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands 
47. Id. at 175. The Court added, "[b]ut in the case before us, with its questionable 
evidence of continuous and exclusive assertions of dominion over the disputed waters, we 
think the disclaimer decisive." Id. 
48. 381 U.S. at 139. 
49. 332 U.S. at 19. 
50. California's claim, at least in part, that Monterey Bay appertained to her on the 
basis of its being a historic bay turned on one state court and one federal court decision, 
namely, Ocean Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 235, 252 P. 722 (1927), and Ocean 
Industries, Inc. v. Greene, 15 F.2d 862 (N.D. Cal. 1926). 
51. California's similar claim to Santa Monica Bay turned on a state court decision 
in People v. Stralla, 14 Cal. 2d 617, 96 P.2d 941 (1939) (finding that the Sheriff of Los Angeles 
County could make an arrest more than three miles from the shorf> line, but within the body 
of the Bay). 
52. The California claim to San Pedro Bay was predicated in part, on United States 
v. Carrillo, 13 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Cal. 1935). 
53. Fisheries Case, supra note 1, at 116. 
54. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 10, art. 4. 
23
Goldie: Historic Bays in International Law
Published by SURFACE, 1984
234 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 11:211 
along the coast in its immediate vicinity ."55 Accordingly, California 
argued that she was free to use such boundary lines across the open-
ing of her bays and around her islands and, in particular, the 
following: 
(1) The first area runs from Bodega Head, to Point Reyes, 
to the outermost inlet of the Farallon Islands and thence to 
Pescadoro Point 
(2) Half Moon Bay 
(3) Morro Bay 
(4) The second such area runs from Point Arguello to Point 
Conception 
(5) California's third claim, namely to the "overall unit area," 
runs from Point Conception to Richardson Rock (21 miles across 
water), to San Miguel Island, to Santa Rosa Island, to Gull Island, 
to San Clemente Island (43 miles); thence back to the mainland at 
Point Loma (56.8 miles). San Nicolas and San Clemente Islands are 
over 50 miles from shore.56 (It should be noted that this "overall 
unit area" embraces inter alia, the Santa Barbara channel, Santa 
Monica Bay and Newport Bay but, of course, extends far beyond 
them.) 
California reinforced her claims, where possible,. by arguing 
that all bays with a closing line of 24 sea miles or less enclosed 
Id. 
55. Article 4 provides: 
1. In localities ~here the coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or if there 
is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight 
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from 
the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must 
be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of 
internal waters. 
3. Baseline shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses 
or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on 
them. 
4. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under the provisions of 
paragraph l, account may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic 
interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of which 
are clearly evidenced by a long usage. 
5. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a man-
ner as to cut off from the high seas the territorial sea of another State. 
6. The coastal State must clearly indicate straight baselines on charts, to which 
due publicity must be given. 
56. See 381 U.S. at 178 (Black, J., dissenting) (Map in Appendix C). The Appendices 
follow page 213 of the Report. 
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internal or "inland" waters - hereinafter referred to as "juridical 
bays" and justified under Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.57 In particular Monterey 
Bay fell within this category. More generally, however, California 
argued that the state's internal or "inland" waters were established 
under her constitution and legislation.158 But the Court, recalling its 
rationale in the 1947 United States v. California decision,59 asserted 
57. Article 7 of the Convention is as follows: 
1. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State. 
2. For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose 
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain landlocked 
waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation 
shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger 
than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of 
that indentation. 
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of indentation is that lying between 
the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the low-
water marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the presence of 
islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn 
on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the different 
mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they were part of the 
water areas of the indentation. 
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of 
a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between 
these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered 
as internal waters. 
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points 
of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four miles shall 
be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of waters 
that is possible with a line of that length. 
6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in any 
case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is applied. 
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 10, art. 7. 
58. See. e.g., 381 U.S. at 153 where the Court correctly credited California with the 
following argument: 
"[I]nland waters" [in the Submerged Lands Act] must have been intended to 
encompass all waters which the States "thought" were inland waters, for that is 
the only way in which the Act can now be interpreted to effectuate fully its sup-
posed "philosophy" of granting to the States all submerged lands within their 
historic boundaries. 
59. 332 U.S. at 19. See id. at 35-36 (footnotes omitted) where the Court states: 
The ocean~ even its three-mile belt, is thus of vital consequence to the nation in 
its desire to engage in commerce and to live in peace with the world; it also becomes 
of crucial importance should it ever again become impossible to preserve that peace. 
And as peace and world commerce are the paramount responsibilities of the nation, 
rather than an individual state, so if wars come, they must be fought by the nation . 
. . . The state is not equipped in our constitutional system with the powers or the 
facilities for exercising the responsibilities which would be concomitant with the 
dominion which it seeks. Conceding that the state has been authorized to exercise 
local police power functions in the part of the marginal belt within its declared 
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that the definition of inland waters was for the Union and not for 
the several states to determine and, further, that since the date 
of the decree of the first California case, the issue has become 
settled by the United States' ratification of the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone on March 24, 1961 and the con-
sequential adoption of the definitions therein. Hence the Court 
applied the "Boggs Formula,"60 namely the 24~mile maximum clos-
ing line for bays plus the "semicircle" test for determining the bay-
like characteristics of the water area enclosed. Finally, the Court 
decided that the choice of asserting claims to inland waters on the 
basis of Article 4's straight baselines was for the United States in 
her conduct of international relations to decide, and not for the 
several states. Applying these principles, the Court found that of 
all the disputed sea areas only Monterey Bay should be classified 
as inland waters and, hence, as appertaining to the State of 
California. (Monterey Bay has a closing line of 19.24 miles across 
its entrance from headland to headland.) On the other hand, none 
of the other coastal segments which California claimed met the 
Court's tests. Hence they did not fall to that State as constituting 
a part of its territory. Accordingly, their outer limits did not con-
stitute the "coast line" of the state from which the statutorily 
quitclaimed three mile belt of state submerged lands would have 
been measured, as claimed by California. 
2. United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case)61 
In the immediately preceding case, United States v. Louisiana 
(Texas Boundary Case),62 the Supreme Court applied its holding in 
boundaries, these do not detract from the Federal Government's paramount rights 
in and power over this area. 
60. The "Boggs Formula" follows the proposed definition by Dr. S. Whittemore Boggs, 
Geographer, Department of State, in his influential article, Boggs, Delimitation of the Ter-
ritorial Sea, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, (1930). In that article Boggs wrote: 
[T]he American proposal is to use a method inside the indentations which is exactly 
similar to the drawing of the arcs of circles from all points along the coast. . . . 
It is drawn, however, not with a radius of three miles but with a radius that is 
proportionate to the width of the entrance. A comparison is then made between 
the area enclosed by the envelope of the arcs of circles and the straight line across 
the entrance ... and the area of a semi-circle whose diameter is proportionate 
to the width of the entrance. When the area of the special "envelope" inside the 
bay exceeds the area of the semi-circle, the waters inside the straight line are na-
tional waters, and the three-mile limit is measured from the straight line. 
Id. at 550. 
61. 394 U.S. at 11. 
62. 394 U.S. at 1. 
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United States v. California.63 In that earlier case it decided that, 
apart from the special circumstances where straight baselines are 
permitted, the submerged lands quitclaimed to the states in the 
Submerged Lands Act should be measured from the "line of 
ordinary low water."64 In the Texas Boundary Case it decided that 
the coastline referred to in the Act was "ambulatory" in that it 
should be viewed as being modified as the extensive erosion and 
accretion of its shores modified the low water mark which provided 
the datum for measuring the quitclaimed submerged lands. 
While the low water mark rule was still seen as basic in the 
Louisiana Boundary Case, the Court did agree that parts of the Loui-
siana coastline should be drawn by straight baselines marking "the 
seaward limit of inland waters."65 In determining the areas to be 
so characterized the Court looked, again, to the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Article 7, and strictly applied 
· the twenty-four-mile closing line and semicircle test (the so-called 
Boggs Formula) for juridical bays. It also recognized the principle 
of straight baselines enunciated and applied by the International 
Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case66 as well as Article 7, 
paragraph 2, of the above Convention and concluded that, since 
there was "too little technical information or consensus among 
nations on that and related subjects to allow the formulation of 
uniform rules,"67 each nation is "left free to draw straight baselines 
along suitable insular configurations if it so desired."68 Hence the 
decision whether or not to invoke this power was entirely in the 
hands of the United States. The Court observed: 
While we agree that the straight baseline method was designed 
for precisely such coasts as the Mississippi River Delta area, we 
adhere to the position that the selection of this optional method 
63. 381 U.S. at 139. 
64. Id. at 175-76. For determining this line the Court followed Article 3 of the Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which provides that "[e]xcept where 
otherwise provided in these articles, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the 
territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially 
recognized by the coastal State." The Court applied this rule as follows: "We interpret the 
two lines thus indicated to conform, and on the official United States coastal charts of the 
Pacific Coast prepared by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, it is the lower 
low-water line which is marked." Id. at 176. 
65. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S,C. § 1302(c). 
66. Fisheries Case, supra note l, at 116. 
67. 394 U.S. at 11. 
68. Id. at 70. 
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of establishing boundaries should be left to the branches of Govern-
ment responsible for the formulation and implementation of foreign 
policy.69 
The Supreme Court also canvassed a third basis for characteriz-
ing maritime areas as "inland waters," namely "historic bays." After 
pointing out that, although historic bays are acknowledged to exist 
in Article 7 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone, they are not defined in the Convention; but the concept 
"therefore derives its content from general principles of 
international law."70 The Court also observed, however, that: "it is 
generally agreed that historic title can be claimed only when the 
'coastal nation has traditionally asserted and maintained dominion 
with the acquiescence of foreign nations' ."11 
The Court did not decide whether Louisiana's evidence of 
historic waters to which it was entitled was "clear beyond doubt,"12 
but remitted that issue to a Special Master. It concluded its holding 
on this subject in the following rather oracular and recondite terms: 
The only fair way to apply the Convention's recognition of historic 
bays to this case, then, is to treat the claim of historic waters as 
if it were being made by the national sovereign and opposed by 
another nation. To the extent the United States could rely on state 
activities in advancing such a claim, they are relevant to the deter-
mination of the issue in this case. 73 
Subsequently, the Special Master found that: 
From the foregoing it is apparent that there is no basis for 
Louisiana's claim of historic inland waters extending beyond the 
limits of its coastline as determined by Section 2(c) of the Sub-
merged Lands Act as interpreted by Subsections 1 through 5 of 
Article 7 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone, Subsection 6 thereof having no application to the 
facts in this case, even though undisputed. All of these facts are 
as consistent with a claim of territorial seas which Louisiana was 
asserting to the extent of 27 miles from its shore line from 1938 
69. Id. at 72-73. The Court relied on U.S. v. California, 381 U.S. at 139, 168. In quoting 
this latter decision the Court said: "[t]he choice under the Convention to use the straight-
baseline method for determining inland waters claimed against other nations is one that 
rests with the Federal Government, and not with the individual States.'' 394 U.S. at 72 
(quoting U.S. v. California, 381 U.S. at 168). 
70. 394 U.S. at 75 (footnote omitted). 
71. 394 U.S. at 23 (quoting U.S. v. California, 381 U.S. at 172 (footnotes omitted)). 
72. 394 U.S. at 77 (quoting U.S. v. California, 381 U.S. at 175). 
73. 394 U.S. at 77-78. 
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to 1953 (Louisiana Act 55 of 1938) and nine miles from its shoreline 
from 1954 until the Court's decision of 1960 (Louisiana Act 33 of 
1954) as they are with any claim of inland waters. Far from being 
clear beyond doubt, the evidence here adduced resembles that 
introduced in the California case which was held to be questionable, 
and therefore insufficient to support a finding of historic waters 
in the face of a contrary declaration by the United States. 
3. United States v. Florida1' 
239 
The most substantial claim which Florida made in this case 
(apart from the claim to submerged lands extending three leagues, 
rather than three sea-miles, under the territorial sea into the Gulf 
of Mexico) was that to Florida Bay as internal waters. (The State 
defined this feature by means of a closing line between the Dry 
Tortugas and Cape Romano, a distance of about one hundred 
nautical miles.) It based this claim on an argument in the alternative. 
Florida Bay was either a juridical bay or an historic bay. 
In the brief decree in this case the Special Master reviewed 
his finding that Florida Bay was not an historic bay. This was on 
the motion of the State of Florida. On the motion of the United 
States, he was ordered to review his finding that a portion of Florida 
Bay, namely the part which could be defined by a twenty-fQur mile 
closing line, was a juridical bay by virtue of his recommendation 
that closing lines be drawn around three groups of islands that make 
up the Florida Keys. 
Subsequently, on May 24, 1976, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, after hearing argument from both the United States 
and Florida on the Special Master's Supplemental Report, entered 
a decree concluding the issues of both historic and juridical bays 
in this case.75 It stated, inter alia, that: 
There is no historic bay on the coast of the State of Florida. There 
are no inland waters within Florida Bay, or within the Dry 
Tortugas Islands, the Marquesas Keys and the lower Florida Keys 
(from Money Key to Key West), the closing lines of which affect 
the rights of either the United States or the State of Florida under 
this decree. 78 
In finding that Florida Bay did not constitute a historic bay 
or historic waters, the Special Master, after reviewing the opinions 
74. U.S. v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975). 
75. U.S. v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976). 
76. Id. at 793. 
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of the Supreme Court in the California and Louisiana cases, con-
cluded that the criteria for establishing the existence of an historic 
bay or historic waters were: 
(1) There must be an open, notorious and effective exercise 
of sovereign authority over the area not merely with respect to 
local citizens but as against foreign nationals as well; 
(2) This authority must have been exercised for a con-
siderable period of time; and 
(3) Foreign states must have acquiesced in the exercise of 
this authority as against their nationals. 77 
The Special Master was, in part, persuaded by the disclaimer 
of the United States that Florida Bay was an historic bay but, in 
the light of the Court's reiteration, in the California and Louisiana 
cases, that such a disclaimer by the United States might not be 
decisive when the state's historic claim was "clear beyond a doubt."78 
He thereupon found that Florida had not met that burden of proof.79 
Indeed, he pointed out that it "seems clear from the evidence that · 
the State of Florida has never, before or since 1968, seized a foreign 
vessel in the disputed area beyond the three-league limit for 
violating its laws."80 
The Special Master's further Report was then appealed to the 
Supreme Court which entered a decree81 upholding that Report in 
general. With regard to historic bays the Court found, as has already 
been pointed out, that there "is no historic bay on the coast of the 
State of Florida."82 
4. United States v. Maine83 
In a brief opinion Justice White, expressing the unanimous 
views of the eight justices participating in the case, upheld the 
Court's prior doctrine regarding states' claims to historic bays. 
While the case had certain unique historical features (it was brought 
by the thirteen original states and therefore required an analysis 
of eighteenth century English law and policy and of the original 
patents granted by the English Crown), these unique features no 
more required the Court to distinguish the California, Texas, Loui-
77. U.S. v. Florida, Report of Albert B. Maris, Special Master, January 18, 1974 (October 
Term 1973, No. 52 Original) 41 [hereinafter cited as Report of the Special Master]. 
78. Id. at 42. 
79. Id. at 46. 
80. Id. at 45. 
81. See U.S. v. Florida, 425 U.S. at 791. 
82. Id. at 793. 
83. U.S. v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975). 
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siana and Florida cases, which have already been discussed, than 
they provided the occasion for any reconsideration of what should 
now be regarded as the Supreme Court's established doctrine with 
regard to states' claims to historic bays. This is especially 
interesting because both Chesapeake and Delaware bays have, since 
the early days of the Union, been regarded as historic bays. 84 Be 
that as it may, the Court was not disposed to disturb the Special 
Master's finding that since these bays were, in effect, less than 
twenty-four miles from headland to headland at their entrances, 
they were the internal waters of the respective states and that there 
was no need to go further with the onerous burden of proof of hav-
ing to adduce "historical evidence [which is] clear beyond doubt."85 
Although these advantageous geographical characteristics do not 
equally apply to the whole of Long Island Sound, and despite the 
fact that traditionally this stretch of water has been regarded as 
internal waters on the basis of historic title, the Maine case tells 
us now that only those parts of the Sound which comply with the 
criteria for establishing juridical bays may now be claimed by the 
littoral states as internal waters. The Court held itself to be bound 
by the earlier cases, not by any doctrine of res judicata, because 
the states parties to the present action had not participated in the 
earlier ones, but by virtue of stare decisis. Hence the Court's three 
criteria858 and its strict requirement of proof of historic title "beyond 
doubt" have become this tribunal's settled doctrine with regard to 
disputes over historic titles between states of this Union and the 
United States. Later an argument will be presented to the effect 
that these holdings, relating as they do to domestic constitutional 
law issues, should not necessarily be viewed as binding on the 
United States in an international dispute with a foreign country-
especially where this country is seeking to uphold an exclusive claim 
on the basis of its historic title. 
5. United States v. Alaska86 
Claiming Cook Inlet to be inland waters on the basis of historic 
title, the State of Alaska offered, for competitive oil and gas lease 
sale, mineral resources in the submerged lands under that arm of 
the Pacific Ocean. Cook Inlet is an elongated body of water extend-
ing from the ocean for some 150 miles into Alaska. Its opening, front-
84. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text regarding both of these bays. 
85. See supra note 72 and the accompanying text. 
85a. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
86. U.S. v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975). 
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ing on the open sea, is some 4 7 miles across from headland to 
headland. This offer prompted the United States to seek injunc-
tive relief and to quiet its title over the submerged lands under 
the Inlet which it claimed. It should be noted that the upper or inner 
portion of the Inlet, namely above the point where a twenty-four 
mile closing line effectively joined its opposite sides, was not in 
dispute. The United States conceded that above such a line the Inlet 
constituted a juridical bay and hence was "inland waters" under 
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. The issue between the state and 
the United States was whether the whole of the Inlet should be 
recognized as an historic bay. 
The Federal District Court for the District of Alaska, where 
the United States sued for relief, dismissed the United States' com-
plaint. The court examined the evidence relating to the periods of 
Russian sovereignty over Alaska, United States sovereignty when 
that area was a federal territory and Alaska's sovereignty after 
becoming a state. It found that Alaska had effectively established 
that Cook Inlet was an historic bay. The Supreme Court, on the 
other hand, by Justice Blackmun for six of the justices to two, 
decided that the District Court's assessment of the legal significance 
of the facts before it was erroneous. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist 
dissented on the ground that both of the courts below had applied 
correct legal criteria for establishing the status of Cook Inlet as 
an historic bay. 
The majority found that the District Court had been clearly 
correct in its finding that the United States had exercised jurisdic-
tion over the Lower Cook Inlet during the period of Alaska's 
existence as a territory, "for the purpose of fish and wildlife 
management."87 It added that: 
It is far from clear, however, that the District Court was correct 
in concluding that the fact of enforcement of fish and wildlife 
regulations was legally sufficient to demonstrate the type of 
authority that must be exercised to establish title to a historic 
bay.88 
The majority stressed its view that to establish Cook Inlet as 
inland or internal waters by virtue of historic title the state would 
have to show that the area had not been one in which foreign ships' 
right of innocent passage had been exercised, for that would be 
87. Id. at 196. 
88. Id. The Court remained unconvinced that fisheries and wildlife management pro-
vided that "the historic evidence [is] clear beyond doubt." Id. See supra note 72 and accom-
panying text. 
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evidence that the area in dispute had been treated as territorial 
sea. Hence evidence of merely the enforcement of fishing and 
wildlife regulations was "patently insufficient,"89 and what had to 
be shown was "historically, an assertion of power to exclude all 
foreign vessels and navigation."90 
On the element · of acquiescence, the District Court had argued 
that historic title had been established by the "failure of any foreign 
nation to protest."91 The Supreme Court, in contrast with the 
International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
Case, decided that "something more than the mere failure to object 
must be shown."92 It added: 
The failure of other countries to protest is meaningless unless it 
is shown that the government of those countries knew or 
reasonably should have known of the authority being asserted.93 
Furthermore, the Court stressed the international dimension 
of a claim to historic title, even in a dispute between a state and 
the United States. It said: 
Alaska clearly claims the waters in question as inland waters, but 
the United States neither supported nor disclaimed the State's 
position. Given the ambiguity of the Federal Government's posi-
tion, we cannot agree that the assertion of sovereignty possessed 
the clarity essential to a claim of historic title over inland 
waters.9aa 
Finally, the Court felt that the evidence was inconclusive 
regarding foreign acquiescence. Rather, it pointed to a Japanese 
protest against the position taken by Alaska.98b 
D. THE RELIANCE OF THE UNITED STATES CASES FOR THE 
CLARIFICATION AND EVOLUTION OF RELEVANT PRINCIPLES 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-PERSUASION, RECEPTION AND 
TRANSFORMATION 
The holding in United States v. Louisiana that the setting of 
states' boundaries is a domestic matter has already been quoted 
89. Id. at 197. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 199-200. 
92. Id. at 200. 
93. Id. These comments clearly testify to a divergence between the Supreme Court 
of the United States and the International Court of Justice's holding in the Fisheries Case, 
see supra text accompanying note 23. 
93a. Id. at 203. 
93b. Id. 
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at length.93c On the other hand, in United States v. California the 
Supreme Court announced that it would follow the criteria pre-
scribed by international law, and especially those agreed upon (for 
example those regarding straight baselines and juridical bays) in 
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 
where applicable.93d In United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boun-
dary Case), it observed that while historic bays were not defined 
in the convention: 
[T]he term ... derives its content from general principles of inter-
national law. As the absence of a definition indicates, there is no 
universal accord on the exact meaning of historic waters. There 
is substantial agreement, however, on the outlines of the doctrine 
and on the type of showing which a coastal nation must make in 
order to establish a claim to historic inland waters.94 
But, because the Court was reluctant to accept disclaimers of 
waters as constituting historic bays by the United States as com-
pletely conclusive, as it had with regard to waters within straight 
baselines (for example those lying shoreward of "fringes of 
islands"95), it did require the state to adduce evidence which is "clear 
beyond doubt" before accepting, or guiding a Special Master to 
accept, that state's case on historic bays as an accepted concept 
of public international law. Secondly, its formulation was contrary 
to what has been seen in international law and especially in the 
Fisheries Case, of a strict burden of proof incumbent upon the 
claimant member state of the Union that it must establish its case 
as "clear beyond doubt." This second issue will be deferred to this 
paper's discussion, under a separate heading, of "burden of proof." 
The former will, however, be taken up in the present context under 
the rubric of the function of international law in the process of deci-
sion when a federal court exercises its original jurisdiction to resolve 
disputes between member states of the federation, and questions 
the persuasiveness of those domestic court decisions before inter-
national tribunals. 
1. International Law in Domestic Tribunals 
The classical generalization, for both American and Com-
monwealth common law jurisdictions, on the relationship of inter-
93c. Supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
93d. 381 u .s. 139, 163-65 (1965). 
94. 394 U.S. at 75 (footnotes omitted). 
95. Id. at 75. See also U.S. v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 203 (1975). 
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national and domestic law, remains Lord Mansfield's declaration 
in Triquet v. Bath that: "the law of nations, in its full extent, [is] 
part of the [common] law."96 But this should not be misunderstood. 
International law binds the state in its international relations while 
municipal law operates within the state. Hence a binding rule of 
municipal law does not operate internationally: nor does a rule of 
international law di'rectly create obligations among private 
individuals. But certain rules of international law call upon states 
to legislate (to "receive" into their domestic system) domestic law 
rules reflecting or implementing those international law obligations 
or rules. Failure to do so would constitute a breach of the state's 
international obligations. The international law rule which is so 
received, however, is transformed into a domestic law rule by the 
act of reception. Anzilotti tells us that: 
D'autre part, etant donnee la separation des orres juridiques, toute 
reception est un act d'etablissement de normes. La reception, de 
plus, implique necessairement une transformation, des normes 
rec;ues, qui va au dela de la pure valeur formelle. Avant tout, toute 
norme s'addresse aux sujects de l'ordre juridique dans lequel elle 
est en vigueur; et puisque le qualite de sujet juridique est une 
correlation entre une entite et les normes qui composent un ordre 
juridique donne, ainsi le seul fait qu'une norme est reu dans un 
ordre juridique, implique que cette norme vaur pour des sujets 
differents de ceux pous lesquels elle valait dane l'ordre interier . 
. . . Une transformation, non seulement formelle, mais meme 
substantielle, est done include dans le concept meme de reception; 
c'est pour quoi il ne semple pas exact deduire l'impossibilite de 
la reception du degre de transformation qui est necessaire dans 
les normes ayant fait l'objet d'une reception.97 
International law only operates in the arena of international 
obligations: municipal law only operates in the arena of municipal 
law obligations. Thus, Lord Mansfield's maxim should be understood 
to mean that, for settling disputes in municipal law, such as domestic 
disputes between private parties, the rule establishing relevant 
international obligations becomes, for the purposes of international 
decision, transformed into norms of municipal law. International 
law may thus, in relevant cases, provide the materials out of which 
the municipal rule of decision is fashioned. Such transformation, 
96. Triquet v. Bath, 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 937-38, 3 Burr. 1478, 1481 (K.B. 1764) (quoting 
Lord Talbot in Barbuit's Case, 25 Eng. Rep. 777, T. Talb. 281 (K.B. 1735)). 
97. ANZILOTTI. 1 COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 62-63 (Gidel Trans. 1929). Note: the 
above quotation is at page 59 of the third edition (1927) (Italian) [hereinafter cited as 
ANZILOTTI). 
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in addition, saves the state from being in breach of its international 
obligations. 
Even when the Supreme Court of the United States, or 
similarly placed courts in other federations, exercises original 
jurisdiction (or its equivalent) in disputes between states, or 
between one or more states and a federal authority, the court does 
not sit as an international tribunal, but as a domestic one. Hence 
the following remark by Dr. James Brown Scott is not accepted 
as far as that writer's belief in the Court's international character 
is concerned: "The Supreme Court [of the United States] is one of 
limited jurisdiction and as an International Court is also one of 
limited jurisdiction and is likely to be so indefinitely .... "98 
Of similar import, of course, was Justice Field's statement, 
which is also not accepted in Iowa v. Illinois, that the "rules of 
international law will be held to obtain, unless changed by statute 
or usage."99 In such remarks as these decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court in conflicts between States of the Union are seen 
simply as applications of international law.100 Of course, in such cases 
the Court has received and applied principles of international law 
as indeed did the Federal High Court of Germany under the Weimar 
Republic101 and as does the Swiss Federal Tribunal.102 But the deci-
sions rendered in such cases are still municipal decisions, settling 
municipal issues under international municipal law. The late Pro-
fessor Josef L. Kunz labeled such decisions as these as falling under 
"international law by analogy" and distinguished this category from 
"genuine international law" and explained his thesis as follows: 
The application of international law norms in these interstate cases 
is neither a duty imposed by international law, nor has it anything 
to do with the municipal "part of the law of the land" rule which 
envisages only genuine international law. It is purely a matter of 
municipal law to apply in such cases international law by analogy.103 
98. Scott, The Role of the SuperM Court of the Unit,ed Staies in the Settlement of Imerstat,e 
Dis]YUtes, 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LA w 1540, 1546 (1938). 
99. Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. l, 10 (1892). 
100. See, e.g., H.A. SMITH. THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT AS AN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
NATIONAL COURTS (1968). 
101. See, e.g., Wurtemberg and Prussia v. Bader (The Donauversinkung Case), Ann. Dig. 
128 (Case No. 86) (Germany, Staatsgerichtshof 1927). 
102. See, e.g., Argona v. Solure, (Federal Court of Switzerland), cited in Trial Smelter 
Case (U.S. v. Canada) 3 R. lnt'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1949). 
103. Kunz, International Law by Analogy, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 329, 334 (1951). 
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2. Domestic Law in International Tribunals 
In Article IV of the compromise of the Trail Smelter Arbitra-
tion the Parties agreed that "The Tribunal shall apply the law and 
practice followed in dealing with cognate questions in the United 
States of America as well as international law and practice .... "10' 
The arbitration clauses of the Treaty of Berlin of 1925 (the 
Peace Treaty signed between Germany and the United States)105 
contained a clause providing that the Tribunal could apply, in the 
settlement of disputes, principles of law common to the legal 
systems of both Parties. Finally, Article 38.1.c. of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (and of the Court's predecessor, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice) extends the list of 
applicable law to "the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations."108 These principles were conceived of as a third 
category independent of treaty and custom and intended "to push 
to the last limit ... the productivity of [the Court's] sources."107 As 
Professor Julius Stone tells us, this source of materials refers to 
common principles analogous to the Old Roman jus gentium, the 
104. Trail Smelter Case, supra note 102, at 1907. 
105. Treaty between the Untied States and Germany of Friendship, Commerce and 
Consular Rights, done Dec. 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132, T.S. No. 725, 8 Bevans 153 (effective Feb. 
10, 1925). 
106. While this category was innovative and creative its formulation has not been 
without criticism. Representatives of the Group of 77 have expressed resentment at the 
choice of the qualifier of the nations whose legal systems provide the materials of legal deci-
sion as "civilized." They tend to see an exclusion of the newly decolonized countries in this 
legal creativity. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.) 
1969 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Feb. 20), for example, Judge Ammoun expressed the view that 
"the term 'civilized nations' is incompatible with the relevant provisions of the United Nations 
Charter, and the consequence thereof is an ill-advised limitation of the notion of the general 
principles of law." Id. at 132. He explained this incompatibility by pointing out that: 
Thus it is that certain nations, to whose legal systems allusion was made above, 
which did not form part of the limited concert of states which did the law-making, 
up to the first decades of the 20th century, for the whole of the international com-
munity, today participate in the determination or elaboration of the general prin-
ciples of law, contrary to what is improperly stated by Article 38, paragraph l(c) 
of the Court's Statute. 
Id. at 34-35. 
Judge Ammoun considered any of the following formulations to be preferable: 
(a) The "universally recognized principles of law" (Root); id. 
(b) The "general principles of law recognized by ... [the] nations" (a voluntary omis-
sion of the offending adjective); id. at 135. 
(c) The "general principles of law recognized in national legal systems" (Waldock); id. 
(d) The "general principles of law." Id. 
107. ANZILOTTI, supra note 97, at 117. 
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highest common factor in national legal systems.108 
It is clearly arguable that the five tidelands litigations between 
the United States and certain states of the Union raising historic 
bay issues in connection with the delimitation of their respective 
shares of the national continental shelf relate to the interpretation 
of a municipal statute, and that the Supreme Court's resort to 
international law is a clear example of transformation in the sense 
that Professor Anzilotti presented that function. International law 
was simply used as providing an interpretative tool for the elucida-
tion of a domestic statute and of the intent of Congress in drafting it. 
Do the five United States continental shelf cases which deal 
with the issue of historic bays then have utility for formulating law 
solutions in delimitation problems, if they cannot be brought within 
the broad and generous scope of "general principles of law?" It is 
agreed that the utility of those cases is that of offering persuasive 
precedents under Article 38, paragraph 1 (d) of the Court's Statute. 
In particular, as later paragraphs will show, they provide useful 
starting points for analysis of such questions as burden of proof, 
the type of authority assured to the coastal state (the quantum of 
the interest if you will) and the residual nature of the historic bays 
concept. 
VII: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RIGHTS 
A. ACTS NECESSARY TO CONSOLIDATE HISTORIC 
TITLE: EFFECTIVENESS 
One theme running through the decisions of the Supreme Court 
of the United States in the California, Texas, Louisiana, Florida 
and Maine cases relating to the establishment of historic title over 
coastal waters so that the claimant states became entitled to regard 
those waters as parts of their territory, consisted of the require-
ment of the continuous and open exercise of authority; authority 
acceded to, moreover, by other (foreign sovereign) states. The states 
asserting such a claim to an historic title must unequivocally exer-
cise an authority which is exclusively referable, not to some lesser 
claim, such as the regulation of fisheries and game, but to its plenary 
and sovereign power. On the other hand, the requirement of the 
open, unequivocal and continuous exercise of authority is, 
necessarily, a relative notion. For example, in the case of Direct 
108. See STONE. LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 137 (1954). See also c. DE 
VISSCHER. THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 400-03 (Corbett trans. 1968) 
[hereinafter cited as DE VISSCHER]. 
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U.S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Cable Co., 109 the Judicial Commit-
tee of the Privy Council found Conception Bay, a very large bay 
indeed off the coast of Newfoundland, to be an historic bay. Unlike 
the United States Supreme Court in the California, Texas, Loui-
siana, Florida and Maine cases which have just been discussed, the 
Judicial Committee was satisfied that the continued control of the 
fishery of the Bay, in the Bay, effectively constituted the relevant 
acts of sovereignty. An act of the British Parliament in closing the 
Bay to foreign fishermen together with the regulations and statutes 
enacted by the Newfoundland Parliament administering fishing in 
the Bay as a colonial Parliament implementing and adapting the 
British statute, were enough to establish the rule that an American 
company, the Direct Cable Company, was not entitled to lay a cable 
in Conception Bay. Interestingly, we can note that the acts of 
sovereignty leading to the establishment of the status of Concep-
tion Bay in Direct U.S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Cable Co. were 
all related to fisheries in the water column of the bay, yet the ac-
tivity to be controlled was a sea-bottom activity- the laying of 
cables. One ground for distinguishing this case from the five decided 
by the Supreme Court of the United States on historic bays lies 
in the relativity of the time and place to the continuity and fre-
quency of acts of sovereignty providing the basis of the claim. These 
questions will be determined by the degree of use and the kind of 
use relative to the location, accessibility, terrain and amenability 
to sovereign control by the claimant state in relation to the uses 
by other states adverse to the coastal state's claim. The Bay of Can-
cale again provides an example. Although this bay was the subject 
of a dispute, that dispute was not settled by judicial proceedings, 
but by an Anglo-French treaty. But the activities which were agreed 
as establishing special French rights there were those of the French 
government's continued and consistent regulation of an oyster 
fishery (as well as other forms of fishing). In contrast with the 
holding of the United States Supreme Court in the Louisiana and 
Florida cases, generally speaking sedentary fisheries, where the 
produce is itself cultivated on the sea bottom and is stationary there, 
appositely lend themselves to the idea of a sovereign activity con-
solidating title over a specific area. The vocational and economic 
activities of the fishermen providing the oysters with their beds 
do not provide the basis for this argument; but the regulation by 
the state of those fishermen, and the protection of the health of 
109. Direct U.S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Cable Co., 2 App. Cas. 394 (P.C. 1877i. 
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consumers by regulating the density of the fishery and the purity 
of the water and by avoiding disease amongst the fish, and so forth, 
especially when the state's regulation of the fishery included the 
letting of oyster-bed leases, do offer sound bases for arguments on 
behalf of historic titles to bays. Interestingly enough, away on the 
other side of the world, Antipodean to the Bay of Cancale, there 
is another historic bay. It lies· off the western coast of Australia. 
Shark Bay is a large bay of some seventy miles in length and forty-
six miles wide at the mouth and for the most part, very shallow .110 
This bay has long been claimed by Australia as an historic bay. In 
the early times of the European settlement extensive pearl fisheries 
were established there. The regulation of the fishery was predicated 
upon the idea, so as to prevent quarrels amongst the pearl 
fishermen, that the colonial government of Western Australia and 
later the state government, should lease sea-bed areas both within 
and without what would normally be the territorial sea, to 
fishermen, giving to each of those fishermen exclusive use and con-
trol of the tract of oyster bed leased to him (a somewhat similar 
system is followed in parts of Chesapeake Bay). This Western 
Australian example, I suggest, illustrates unequivocally what is 
meant by an exercise of sovereignty. The whole area is administered 
and controlled, and there is unequivocal compliance with the legisla-
tion and the clauses of the leases issued by the government. Fur-
thermore, no foreign state, or ships wearing foreign flags, have fish-
ed there. The exercise of police power in ensuring that the leases 
are complied with provides testimony that there is a clear exer-
cise of territorial sovereignty by the very fact that the state is 
prepared to give leases of the soil of the sea-bed within the whole 
extent of the bay for the purpose of ensuring the peaceable exploita-
tion of its bounty. Of course, other bays have been viewed as historic 
without such an intensely territorial and detailed exercise of 
sovereign control as illustrated in the Direct U.S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-
A merican Cable Co. case. 
110. Historic Bays claimed by Australia (since earliest times of settlement) would appear, 
from a letter from the Secretary of the Navy Office, Melbourne to Professor Charteris of 
Sydney University Law School, dated April 26, 1936 (copy held in author's files), to be: 
1. Van Dieman's Gulf 
2. Exmouth Gulf 
3. Shark Bay 
4. Moreton Bay 
Breadth at 
Mouth (miles) 
34.4 
26 
46 
8.7 
Penetration 
..mile&.. 
95.5 
42.4 
70.4 
8.7 
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An interesting question now arises regarding the status of 
Delaware and Chesapeake Bays iil light of the holding of the United 
States Supreme Court in the Maine case. It should be pointed out 
that the twenty-four mile closing line for "juridical bays" is of 
relatively recent origin- international consensus only being finally 
formalized at the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea. Accordingly one may ask whether, after the general recep-
tion of the twenty-four mile closing line, the question is still rele-
vant regarding these two bays, no matter what may have been the 
concept's importance to them prior to the reception of the modern 
concept of juridical bays. In addition, the characterization of the 
United States' title to these bays as based on historic grounds may 
still be of importance independently of their contemporary status 
as juridical bays. Waters seaward of the twenty-four mile closing 
line may be recognized as internal waters of the coastal state under 
international law, as distinct from domestic law, if title can be shown 
to be predicated on historic grounds. Be that as it may, there seems 
to be ample evidence of historic title over these bays which, 
however, may lapse if permitted to fall into desuetude. 
The status of Chesapeake Bay, which had been originally within 
the lands which King James I granted to the Virginia Company in 
1609, was finally settled by the Second Court of Commissioners of 
the Alabama claims in the case of Stetson v. United States which 
asserted that "[w]e are forced to the conclusion that Chesapeake 
Bay must be held to be wholly within the territorial jurisdiction and 
authority of the United States and no part of the high seas .... "111 
Prior to the American Revolution, Delaware Bay, like 
Chesapeake Bay, was considered by the British Crown to be part 
of its territories in North America and was transferred, in the 1783 
Treaty of Paris, to the newly created republics constituting the 
United States. Then, ten years later and during Britain's wars with 
revolutionary France, the French frigate L 'Embuscade took a British 
ship, the Grange, as prize more than three miles off-shore, but within 
a line joining Cape May and Cape Henlopen. 
On May 14, 1793 the then Attorney-General of the United 
States declared that the Grange had been seized within the neutral 
territory of the United States. France released the captured ship, 
thereby recognizing the neutral status of the waters where she had 
111. MOORE. 4 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 4333, 4341, (1898). See MOORE, 1 DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 742 (1906). 
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been taken and, since Great Britain had accepted the return of the 
vessel, she, too, recognized the neutrality of the bay and hence its 
status as a bay subject to the coastal state's sovereignty over its 
full extent.112 The United States' historic title has not been 
challenged since then. Indeed, it was promptly acquiesced in by the 
two maritime nations with the greatest interest in the bay's status, 
and thus, provides a clear example of the manner in which effec-
tive control ripened into an unchallenged historic title. 
Just as the types of controlling acts which justify sovereignty 
and control are relative to and dependent on the terrain, the 
intensity of use and the degree of accessibility of the territory 
claimed are crucial. So, too, is the frequency or continuity of 
sovereign activities over a bay claimed by means of an historic title. 
To achieve effectiveness these are, similarly, relative and depen-
dent on the factors of location, ease of control and the types of 
sovereign acts, as well as the world community's interest in resisting 
its status as an enclosed bay. Here Dr. Huber's arbitration (not 
relating to the consolidation of an historic title over a sea area, but 
over an island) in the Island of Palmas (Miangas) Case, 113 conflicts 
with the Judgement of the Permanent International Court of Justice 
in the Eastern Greenland Case11' and finally the Mexican/French 
arbitration with regard to the status of Clipperton Island.115 This 
last decision took the relativity doctrine almost to its ultimate 
limit- the dependence of the sovereign acts on the accessibility of 
territory was taken to mean that when the territory is almost com-
pletely inaccessible and the world community's interest in its 
political fate minimal, the requisite sovereign acts are reduced to 
just above a nullity, yet they may be treated as sufficient to 
establish title. 
B. THE CRITICAL DATE116 
In international law the point of time falling at the end of a 
period within which the material facts of a claim are said to have 
112. MOORE. 1 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 735-39 (1906); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 32 (1793). 
113. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb.1928). 
114. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.l.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, 
at 3 (Judgment of Apr. 5). 
115. Clipperton Island Case (France v. Mexico) 2 R. lnt'l Arb. Awards 1105 (1949); 
Arbitral Award on the Subject of the Difference Relative to the Sovereignty Over Clipper-
ton Island, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932). See Dickinson, The Clipperton Island Case, 27 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 130 (1933). 
116. For a fuller presentation of this theme see Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 INT0L & 
COMP. L.Q. 1251 (1963) [hereinclfter cited as Goldie, The Critical Date]. 
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occurred is usually called the "critical date." It is also the date after 
which the actions of the parties to a dispute can no longer affect 
the issue.117 It is exclusionary, and it is terminal. Hence it is most 
frequently resorted to in cases of historic title to indicate the period 
within which a party should be able to show the crystallization of 
its title or its fulfillment of the requirement of the doctrine of ac-
quisitive prescription or consolidation. Elsewhere118 this writer has 
discussed, as examples of the uses of the critical date for the pur-
pose of establishing a consolidation of historic title, the establish-
ment of a limited Norwegian sovereignty over Spitzbergen119 under 
the Treaty of Paris of 1920, 120 the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 121 
the Island of Palmas Case,122 the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland 
Case, 123 the Right of Passage Case12' and the Fisheries Case.125 In all 
these cases the critical date was an essential element indicating 
the point of time from which the Court was satisfied that the rights 
in question had crystallized. They were shown to have depended 
on the point of time of the convergence of distinct sets of facts of 
concatenations of events which characterizes or defines the issues 
between the claimant states and their opponents. This is the point 
of the common juristic definition of the dispute-the point at which 
117. Johnson, supra note 24, at 324 n.4. See Sir Lionel Heald's submission to a similar 
effect before the International Court of Justice in Minquiers and Ecrehos (U.K. v. Nor.), 
1953 I.C.J. Pleadings 2, 48-61 (Oral Argument of Sir Lionel Heald) (Judgment of Nov. 17). 
118. Goldie, The Critical Date, supra note 116, at 1256-57. 
119. Id. at 1252-64. 
120. Treaty between the United States and Other Powers Relating to the Spitsbergen 
Archipelago, done Feb. 9, 1920, 43 Stat. 1892, T.S. No. 686, 2 Bevans 269 (effective Feb. 18, 
1924). The nine signatory states were Denmark, France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Japan, 
Norway, Sweden, and the United States of America. Norway's sovereignty was recognized 
over Bear Island and of the resort to this archipelago by the nationals of many European 
countries from the late middle of the seventeenth century to the 1920 Agreement, see Scott, 
Arctic Exploration and International Law, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 928, 930, 937 (1909); Lansing, A 
Unique International Problem, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1971); FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE 
SEA 112, 104, 181, 182-83, 193, 194, 198-200, 527 (1911). For a brief outline of the 1920 Treaty 
see Nielsen, The Solution of the Spitzbergen Question, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 232 (1920). Soviet 
Russia protested against the 1920 Treaty in 1923, see 8 BULLETIN DE L'INSTITUT INTERMEDAIRE 
INTERNATIONAL 311 (1923), as she had not been consulted. In 1924, however, the Soviets 
informed the Norwegian government that they would recognize Norwegian sovereignty over 
Spitzbergen. Letter from the Norwegian Minister (Bryn) to the Secretary of State, March 
20, 1924, [1924] 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. at 1 (1939 ed.). 
121. Minquiers and Ecrehos, supra note 117, at 47. 
122. Island of Palmas Case, supra note 113. 
123. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, supra note 114. 
124. Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 
6 (Judgment of Apr. 12). 
125. Fisheries Case, supra note 1, at 6. 
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"the issues are joined." For before a dispute can be the subject of 
adjudication, the separately characterized right-creating facts in the 
dispute must be brought to a common ground: their convergence 
must necessarily be effectuated. The critical date arises when ques-
tions of time form a necessary element in the point of convergence. 
This concept of a critical date may be illustrated by disputes 
over territory. In such cases a series of acts creating no more than 
an inchoate title126 (each of which in itself not being sufficient to 
establish the claimant's title) may be seen to converge with, for 
example, acts of recognition by other states. The establishment of 
Norway's sovereignty over Spitzbergen illustrates this point. After 
several centuries, during which her sovereignty re~ained inchoate 
and disputed, Norway gained a perfected title by virtue of its 
recognition by the Powers in the Treaty of 1920 signed at Paris. 
Norway's acts, never sufficient in themselves to perfect her title, 
but capable of keeping her claim alive, converged with the general 
recognition in 1920 to create a complete sovereignty which came 
to be recognized by the third states. On the other hand, in 1923 
the Soviet Union protested against the perfection of Norway's title 
by the general recognition at a conference in which she did not 
participate.121 But in 1928 she recognized Norway's sovereignty in 
a separate agreement.128 A situation may be brought into focus, and 
a critical date result, from convergence through a peace treaty, the 
demarcation of a frontier, a general agreement of recognition, or 
a guarantee of frontiers, with the unilateral acts of the claimant 
state which had, previously, been sufficient only to establish an 
inchoate title, or to assert a provisional or tentative claim. This 
example illustrates the convergence of facts and their crystalliza-
tion into a legal relation. The converging facts form the elements 
of legal relation, and their convergence firmly establishes that legal 
relation in the place of a situation which would otherwise have 
remained inchoate and unripe for settlement. 
The critical date is more, it should be stressed129 than a pro-
cedural rule for the exclusion of evidence and more than a rule 
126. For a discussion of the concept of "inchoate title" in international law see HALL. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-28 (P. Higgins ed. 8th ed. 1924); OPPF,NHF.TM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 
558-59 (Lauterpacht ed. 8th ed. 1955). 
127. See Soviet Protest, supra note 120, at 341. 
128. Treaty between the United States and Other Powers Relating to Spitzbergen 
Archipelago, supra note 120. 
129. See Goldie, The Critical Date, supra note 116, at 1257-64. 
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whereby the tribunal's jurisdiction may be successfully objected 
to. It is a substantive r.ule setting a term to the span of time dur-
ing which, in a given case, right-creating facts can be availed of 
in order to perfect a title. This aspect of the doctrine is connected 
with Professor de Visscher's concept of "consolidation by historic 
title."130 This was brought out in the Fisheries Case, 131 especially 
where the International Court of Justice said: 
From the standpoint of international law, it is now necessary 
to consider whether the application of the Norwegian system en-
countered any opposition from foreign States. 
Norway has been in a position to argue without any contradiction 
that neither the promulgation of her delimitation Decrees in 1869 
and in 1889 nor their application gave rise to any opposition on 
the part of foreign States. Since, moreover, these Decrees con-
stitute, as has been shown above, the application of a well-defined 
and uniform system, it is indeed the system itself which would reap 
the benefit of general toleration, the basis of an historical consolida-
tion which would make it enforceable as against all States. 
The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the interna-
tional community, Great Britain's position in the North Sea, her 
own interest in the question, and her prolonged abstention would 
in any case warrant Norway's enforcement of her system against 
the United Kingdom.182 
As Professor D.H.N. Johnson has pointed out, this concept of 
consolidation may be used to show a good root of title to territory.133 
It is submitted, however, that before it can become an effective 
means of showing a good root of title it requires further develop-
ment and specificity in application. So far it seems capable, as the 
example of the Fisheries Case shows, of doing no more than pro-
viding an apparent post hoc justification to a decision which might 
otherwise be exceptionable. How may a state utilize the doctrine 
to justify a claim, or to defend an exercise of jurisdiction? Unless 
there is some means, either qualitatively or quantitatively, of setting 
a term to the period of consolidation, it remains a broken reed to 
those who would put their trust in it, for until it has crystallized-
130. DE VISSCHER, supra note 108, at 200-01, 215, 217. 
131. Fisheries Case, supra note 1, at 116. 
132. Id. at 138-39. 
133. Johnson, Consolidation as a Root of Title in lnU3rnational Law, supra note 24, at 215. 
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become consolidated-it must lack certainty and specificity of 
application. This weakness arises from the fact that neither the 
International Court of Justice, nor Professors de Visscher and 
Johnson have proposed any means of indicating when a given 
historic title may be said to have become consolidated. 
On the other hand, the uses to which Judge Basdevant and Sir 
Percy Spender put the critical date doctrine in the Minquiers and 
Ecrehos and Rights of Passage cases respectively demonstrate the 
utility of that doctrine in giving a hard cutting edge to the con-
solidation of historic titles. The convergence of separate activities,. 
which is inherent in the notion of the critical date as discussed in 
the preceding paragraphs, provides the means of determining the 
period over which the claimant may be said to have consolidated 
its sovereignty, or failed in the enterprise. The argument here is 
that since general international law sets no fixed period for the con-
solidation or perfection of titles, the relevant aspect of the critical 
date doctrine, namely the convergence of disparate elements, pro-
vides a functional terminating point to a period over which a state 
may consolidate or perfect its title to a disputed territory or to a 
right similar to an easement or servitude. It does not follow from 
this, however, that the decision of whether a good root of title has 
come into being lies in the Court's discretion. The critical date doc-
trine comes into operation when a catalytic event which, converg-
ing as it were with a series of acts constituting a state's inchoate 
relation to a territory, crystallizes that relation and presents it for 
a decision as to whether the acts in question have consolidated the 
title claimed, or have failed. 
Examples of this convergence, operating with a catalytic effect 
to terminate a period of indeterminate activity, either in favor of 
the claimant, or against it, may be found in each of the cases 
discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. Thus the Treaty of Paris 
of 1898 operated to terminate any possible inchoate claims that 
Spain, or her successor in title, may have had in the Palmas Island 
Case and which were derivable from the discoveriesin the sixteenth 
century. Similarly, because the Norwegian Proclamation of 
sovereignty over Eastern Greenland was effective to give a fixed 
and certain definition to the issues of the dispute between Denmark 
and Norway, and crystallize the formulae of each of the parties' 
claims in th.e Status of Eastern Greenland Case, that Proclamation's 
date, July 10, 1931, provided the critical date of the dispute. Again 
Judge Basdevant's opinion in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case 
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illustrates this point. There the Treaty of Bretigny, it is suggested, 
had the effect of settling the partition of Normandy between 
England and France and so provided the critical date. Finally, the 
Treaty of 1878 crystallized the relations of the sovereigns of India 
and Goa respectively in the Rights of Passage Case. In reconcilia-
tion, on the level of legal principles, of the majority's decision and 
Sir Percy Spender's dissent, it is submitted that once the view of 
the critical date proposed in this paper is accepted, the difference 
between the majority and Sir Percy Spender becomes limited to 
the factual issue of whether the Treaty merely reflected no more 
than a practice of accommodation on the part of the sovereign of 
the neighboring territories or whether it granted rights capable 
of becoming vested. 
In conclusion it should be observed that, in its substantive, 
right-creating, aspect the critical date doctrine provides a point of 
time as the touchstone for qualifying or selecting the operative facts, 
and hence for characterizing appropriate cases. In this way the doc-
trine effectively brings the whole legal relation into focus. Once 
determined upon or manifest, the critical date sets limits to the 
period within which the definitive facts can be seen as having taken 
place. This in turn leads to the casting of the issues of the dispute 
into a concrete form-for example, the perfection of titles to ter-
ritory, or the espousal of a claim, or the characterization of trans-
actions affected by the emergence of new rights of sovereignty or 
dominion. 
VIII. BURDEN OF PROOF 
A. A VIEW FROM THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT 
The United Nations Secretariat, in its study for the Interna-
tional Law Commission, Juridical Regimes of Historic Waters 
Including Historic Bays1:u stated: 
The task of the parties to a dispute [over historic waters] 
seems less to establish certain facts than to persuade the judges 
to follow their respective opinions regarding the evaluation of the 
facts. Still, the question of the burden of proof cannot be ignored, 
in particular since it is one of the problems usually raised in con-
nection with the right to "historic waters."135 
134. Juridical Regimes of Historic Waters Including Historic Bays, supra note 15. 
135. Id. at 21. 
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The paper, however, then asserts that: 
Each of the opponents therefore bears the burden of proof 
with respect to the facts on which they rely. Obviously, this 
involves an evaluation not only of the evidence presented regard-
ing the facts but also of the importance of these facts as signs of 
the alleged exercise of sovereignty .138 
It concludes its substantive statement on the matter with the 
observation that: 
In summarizing this discussion of the problem of the burden 
of proof, it may be said that the general statement that the burden 
of proof is on the State claiming historic title to a maritime area 
is not of much value.137 
The idea that the burden of proof, as distinct from the burden 
of persuasion, shifts from the first party (claimant) whose duty it 
was to prove its case to the other party if he wishes to win, of 
answering, is surely contrary to what we are taught by the cases. 
There is a confusion here between the legal obligation of the burden 
of proof with the advocate's factual and contingent task of carry-
ing the burden of convincing the court that the burden of proof has 
or has not been discharged, or that the facts adduced have either 
been discredited or answered or, in terms of "confession and 
avoidance," although the claimant has successfully discharged its 
burden of proof, the opposing party has adduced its own indepen-
dent affirmative facts negating the effect of the claimant's discharge 
of its burden of proof. Of these latter facts raised defensively the 
party that raises them (the opposing party) must prove them. But 
such an act of answering or discrediting the original case is surely 
not discharging a sort of countervailing "burden of proof." It is 
merely successfully performing the advocate's task of persuasion. 
Only when the opponent raises independent facts does he carry the 
burden of proof on the basis of the old maxim "he who alleges must 
prove," for the rest he carries the "burden of persuasion." This 
burden, rather than that of proof, shifts as the case develops. 
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S DOCTRINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States has 
already been outlined in this paper and an argument has been 
136. Id. at 22. 
137. Id. at 22-23. 
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presented for evaluating its utility in the international arena. First, 
the Supreme Court established specific requirements for the pur-
pose of settling, in terms of domestic United States federal law, 
disputes between the United States and the several states over the 
interpretation of the Submerged Lands Act. These requirements 
were threefold, namely: 
(1) There must be an open, notorious and effective exercise 
of sovereign authority over the area not merely with respect to 
local citizens but as against foreign nationals as well; 
(2) This authority must have been exercised for a con-
siderable period of time; and 
(3) Foreign states must have acquiesced in the exercise of 
this authority as against their nationals.138 
As has already been pointed out, these United States domestic 
law requirements are much more stringent than those laid down 
in the Fisheries Case where the International Court of Justice was 
satisfied that Norway could establish her claim to have consolidated 
historic title to the waters lying beyond her territorial sea measured 
by traditional methods, through merely carrying a far lighter burden 
of proof and far fewer requirements. The International Court of 
Justice stressed Norway's domestic actions and interests while the 
Supreme Court of the United States rigorously looked for confirma-
tion of the consolidated reality of the right through its affirmation 
by control of foreign citizens and acquiescence by foreign states. 
Nor was the Norwegian case established by facts which were "clear 
beyond a doubt."139 Rather, the International Court of Justice 
accepted evidence that was not conclusive and interpreted 
ambiguities, not in favor of the party seeking to vindicate the world 
community's freedom of the high seas, but in support of the state 
seeking to establish an encroachment.1'° For example, Waldock tells 
us: 
The principal argument of the United Kingdom was that, even if 
the 1869 and 1889 Decrees did apply a definite system in 
Norwegian law, it was unreasonable to fix other states with 
knowledge of the acquiescence in a system which only lay concealed 
in these two minor decrees covering small sections of the coast.1' 1 
138. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
139. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
140. See Waldock, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.114, 117-24, 
152-66 (1951). 
141. Id. at 163. Waldock pointed out 
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That the Supreme Court of the United States has imposed, on 
states of the United States which seek to appropriate submerged 
lands beyond the statutory margin measured from the low water 
mark, a more onerous burden of persuasion than that required of 
Norway by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case, 
may or may not provide a persuasive doctrine for international 
tribunals. It may be well to point out, however, that the Supreme 
Court was guided by the claims of all states, coastal and landlocked, 
of the Union for the vindication of the community interest of all 
as represented by the United States, as well as by the special rights 
of the coastal states which were vouchsafed to them under the 
Submerged Lands Act. Such decisions as the Fisheries Case may, 
from this perspective, appear to treat the world community 
interests rather more cavalierly than did the Supreme Court of the 
United States treat the community interests of the Union. But while 
this issue of the different policy perspectives of the different Courts 
may be of significance, it must be recalled that the systems are 
juridically, as they may also be perceived as politically, distinct and 
independent. But surely their shared values may call for a degree 
of mutual relevance- each within their own spheres? 
IX. THE RIGHTS OF THE COASTAL STATE 
Generally speaking, writers and publicists, as well as a majority 
of the arbitrations and World Court decisions on the subject, classify 
historic waters and historic bays as internal waters-that is, waters 
subject to the same degree of state authority as the state's land . 
territory and inland lakes, so that the state's territorial sea is 
measured from baselines constituting the outer limits of the historic 
waters or bays. This characterization of the waters of historic bays 
is also reflected in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone142 by reading together Articles 5(1) and 7(6) of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea143 the same 
principle is carried through unchanged into this a test treaty on 
[t]he superiority of a system so largely subjective and so dependent on loyaute 
et moderation over the essentially objective, geographical system [as, for exam-
ple, that advocated by the Untied Kingdom] hardly seems obvious in a world of 
sovereign states less than half of which have subjected themselves to the risk of 
having their loyaute et moderation investigated by the International Court. 
Id. at 170. 
142. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 10. 
143. 1982 Convention, supra note 13, arts. 5(1) & 7(6). 
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the law of the sea. Within such internal waters no right of inno-
cent passage exists for the benefit of foreign flag shipping. Foreign 
flag shipping may not even transit harmlessly through the waters 
of historic bays without the leave and license of the coastal state. 
Indeed, it is the existence of this right through the coastal state's 
territorial sea which distinguishes this category of maritime zones 
from internal waters. 
The United Nations Secretariat's study of the Juridical Regimes 
of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays 144 which has already been 
critically adverted to, asserts that historic bays may, depending 
on their individual histories, belong to one of these two categories. 
It states: 
On the other hand, it should be recalled that the right to 
uhistoric bays" is based on the effective exercise of sovereignty 
over the area claimed, together with the general toleration of 
foreign States. The sovereignty exercised can either be 
sovereignty as over internal waters or sovereignty as over the ter-
ritorial sea. In principle, the scope of the historic title emerging 
should not be wider in scope than the scope of the sovereignty 
actually exercised. If the claimant State exercised sovereignty as 
over internal waters, the area claimed would be internal waters, 
and if the sovereignty exercised was sovereignty as over the ter-
ritorial sea, the area would be territorial sea.1' 5 
This writer is doubtful of the validity of this proposition. It 
does have a certain superficial attractiveness. On the other hand, 
when the International Court of Justice was called upon to deter-
mine the status of waters over which ships of many nations had 
transited it found, in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, that, 
without exception, all the waters lying behind baselines connecting 
the outermost skerries and rocks of the Norwegian rock rampart 
to be internal waters. But there are at least two channels within 
the skerrygard which are highways of international navigation, one 
is the West Fjord leading to N arvik and allowing passage both south 
and north to the Lofoten Islands, and the Indrelea (a channel which 
permits through passage at its north and south ends). Transit 
parallel to the coast is thus possible. The channel has been used 
by ships navigating to and from the Norwegian port of Transholm. 
144. Juridical Regimes of Historic Waters Including Historic Bays, supra note 15. 
145. Id. at 23. 
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So we have both these passages (West Fjord and the Indrelea) as 
examples of what had been treated as subjects to rights of inno-
cent passage by the world community, and yet have been allowed 
by the International Court of Justice to be imprinted, after its judg-
ment at least, with the status of internal waters. Back in 1868, the 
Norwegian authorities arrested a fishing boat Les Quatres Freres 
in the West Fjord and the French Empire protested, and protested 
vigorously, against this arrest, giving as its reason that the West 
Fjord served as a passage for navigation towards the north.146 There 
is no doubt about the truth of that factual statement and yet, as 
has already been pointed out, despite the International Court of 
Justice's earlier holding that a right of innocent passage existed 
in territorial waters in straits connecting areas to the high seas, 
it found, in the instant case, that Norway was entitled to close those 
passages of straits, namely the West Fjord and the lndrelea. Hence 
it is at least arguable that one might well say that, since the Anglo-
N orwegian Fisheries Case is frequently cited as an authority, the 
International Court of Justice's willingness to deny rights of inno-
cent passage in or through any Norwegian historic bays, or through 
any Norwegian historic waters, despite their previous use as 
maritime highways, tends to throw doubt on the United Nations 
Secretariat's position. The International Court of Justice has told 
us quite conclusively that, despite its previous holding- of only a 
couple of years before-in the Corfu Channel case,147 that waters 
through which third states claimed rights of innocent pass~ge such 
as the West Fjord and the Indrelea could still be found t<>be inter-
nal waters (and thereby no longer subject to other state~s rights 
of innocent passage) by reason of Norway's assertion, and proof, 
of her historic title. 
Indeed, the only way one can rationally reconcile the Corfu 
Channel case with the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case is in terr11s 
of the Court's finding of the status of Norway's historic bays and 
waters to be internal waters, even though the two passages already 
discussed, namely the Indrelea and the West Fjord, "connected two 
146. Memorial of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J . Pleadings (1 Fisheries 
Case) annex 12, at 188 (Memorial dated Jan. 27, 1950); Norwegian Counter-Memorial (U.K. 
v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings (2 Fisheries Case) annex 15, at 53-55 (Counter-Memorial dated 
July 31, 1950); Reply of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings (2 Fisheries 
Case) 330-32 (Reply dated Nov. 28, 1950); Rejoinder of the Kingdom of Norway (U.K. v. Nor.), 
1951 I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Fisheries Case) 69 (Rejoinder dated Apr. 30, 1951). 
147. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9). 
52
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1984], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss2/3
1984) Historic Bays in International Law 263 
areas of the high seas" through which foreign shipping ordinarily 
and necessarily transited. In the Corfu Channel case, we may recall, 
it was the use of that channel as a passage connecting two high 
seas areas (even although it was less than six miles wide) that 
preserved the Royal Navy's right, and the rights of all other navies 
and merchant ships, to navigate through it in terms of their rights 
of innocent passage. While the Corfu Channel was territorial sea, 
the Norwegian channels were internal waters by virtue of Norway's 
consolidation of an historic title over them. In conclusion, then, the 
United Nations Secretariat's proposition that the rights of 
sovereignty or jurisdiction over historic waters or bays, which a 
coastal state may claim are dependent on the competences or type 
of sovereignty exercised, is questionable. In its regard we may find 
reinforcement for the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case in the justly 
famous decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
the heyday of its functions as an imperial court deciding cases 
between member states of the British Empire as well as between 
their citizens, in the Direct U.S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Cable 
Co.,148 where a title consolidated in terms of fishery regulation (which 
in terms of the United Nations Secretaritat's thesis would merely 
establish a competence over fisheries, or at most rights in the nature 
of the territorial sea, leaving intact rights of innocent passage), was 
seen as establishing a plenary competence including full sovereignty 
and control over the laying of cables on the sea-bed, and the full 
spectrum of activities lying between those discrete undertakings. 
By contrast the critical comments which have been given in this 
paper of the Untied Nations Secretariat's view are vindicated by 
the excerpt from the judgment of the International Court of Justice 
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case quoted at the beginning of 
this paper. This statement, moreover, accurately reflects customary 
international law.149 
X. SOME CODIFICATION PROPOSALS 
A. A VIEW FROM AFRICA 
Despite the failure of the International Law Commission and 
the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences to agree on a 
generally acceptable definition of historic bays, some proposals have 
been forthcoming both within and without the Third United Nations 
148. Direct U.S. Cable Co., (1877) L.R. 2 App. Cas. 394 (P.C.). 
149. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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Conference on the Law of the Sea. For example, the African States 
Regional Seminar held in Yaounde on 20-30 June 1972 adopted, inter 
alia, the following recommendations on "'Historic Bays' and 
'Historic Rights':" 
(1) That the "historic rights" acquired by certain neighbor-
ing African States in a part of the Sea which may fall within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of another State should be recognized and 
safeguarded. 
(2) The impossibility of an African State to provide evidence 
of an uninterrupted claim over a historic bay should not constitute 
any obstacle to the recognition of the rights of that State over such 
a bay.150 
The exception, in paragraph two above, of the practice in former 
colonial areas pursued by the former colonial power refers to the 
problem of how much credence should be given to the formulations 
and policies arising from a former colonial occupation. A major 
maritime colonial power may, in the pursuit of vindicating a policy 
giving the freedom of the high seas the widest possible geographical 
extent, have determinedly refrained from championing a subject 
community's previously acquired, or possible inchoate, historic 
rights in order to remain consistent in its global policy. Or, alter-
natively, it may have refrained from enforcing such historic rights 
against third states in order to give a quid pro quo for the opening 
up to the access of the world community by such third states of 
their enclosed seas. Such a consistency of policy, the African ~,tates 
Regional Seminar indicates, would have been bought at toe» high 
a price and should not be permitted to continue to provide a ruling 
principle in the post-colonial age. 
Although this Seminar provides us with a very interesting 
point of view regarding states' refusals to be bound by~' policies 
stemming from the colonial era which they view as stultifyint their 
national interests in coastal waters, it was disappointing because 
it still left its member states' perceptions of historic bays undefined. 
Perhaps the persistence of specific political rivalries in maritime 
areas made agreement on an effective definition impossible. 
150. Conclusions in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the 
Law of the Sea, held in Yaounde, from 20-30 June 1972, circulated as a Document of the 
United Nations General Assembly Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and Ocean 
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction II, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/79 (mimeo. July 
21, 1972). 
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B. POLITICS IN THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON 
THE LAW OF THE SEA: FORESTALLING A SOLUTION 
During the course of the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea the issue of historic bays was raised in the 
Second Committee, mostly during the Second Session (at Caracas) 
and delegates whose states had an interest in such bays or made 
a special claim to historic waters (including Tonga's claim, propounded 
on historic grounds, to a rectangle of the Pacific Ocean of 
approximately 150,000 square miles)151 spoke strongly on the 
subject.152 At the Third Session of the conference (in Geneva) an 
informal consultative group on historic bays and historic waters 
held two meetings. In addition, a smaller working party was formed 
and held two meetings.153 But it was not until the following year 
that draft articles came before the Second Committee. That was 
the document which Colombia submitted. It was as follows: 
1. A bay shall be regarded as historic only if it satisfies all of 
the following requirements: 
(a) that the State or States which claim it to be such shall 
have clearly stated that claim and shall be able to demonstrate 
that they have had sole possession of the waters of that bay 
continuously, peaceably and for a long time, by means of acts 
of sovereignty or jurisdiction in the form of repeated and con-
tinuous official regulations on the passage of ships, fishing and 
any other activities of the nationals or ships of other States; 
(b) that such practice is expressly or tacitly accepted by 
third States, particularly neighbouring States. 
2. A bay the coasts of which belong to two or more States and 
which satisfies the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 of this 
article shall be regarded as historic only when there is agreement 
between the coastal States to that effect. 
3. The coastal State or States shall notify the International 
Hydrographic Organization of the agreement or agreements 
referred to in the foregoing paragraph and shall mark them on 
151. See Statement of Mr. Tupou (Tonga), reprinted in II UNCLOS III OFFICIAL 
RECORDS, supra note 17, at 107. 
152. See Statement of Mr. Herrera Caceras (Honduras), id. at 101; Statement of Mr. 
Abad Santos (Philippines), id. at 102; Statement of Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), id. at 
104; Statement of Mr. Santiso Galvez (Guatemala), id. at 106; Statement of Mr. Herrera 
Caceras (Honduras), id. at 108; Statement of Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), id.; Mr. Abad 
Santos (Philippines), id. at 111. 
153. See IV THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL 
RECORDS 196 (1975) [hereinafter cited as IV UNCLOS II OFFICIAL RECORDS (1975)). 
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large-scale charts prepared by the States concerned. Until such 
notification is supplied, the regime of. historic bay shall not apply 
to the said bay. 
4. No claim to historic bays shall include land, territory or waters 
under the established sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction 
of other States.154 
The student of the Conference's proceedings may well 
anticipate a spirited debate of this perhaps unnecessarily restric-
tive formulation of the doctrine. But, having placed this draft on 
record, Colombia appeared to be satisfied, for example, by the non-
inclusion of this topic in the list of "core issues" upon which the 
Conference was determined to concentrate as expressed in its 
"Organization of Work: Decisions taken by the Conference at its 
90th Meeting on the Report of the General Committee."155 Nor would 
there appear to be any further debate, or at least significant debate, 
on the record. Thus the Colombian draft article appears as the only 
attempt, by the participating states at the Conference, to define 
historic bays. 
On the other hand, it should be remembered that Colombia has 
actively opposed Venezuela's claim to exercise sovereignty over 
almost the full extent of the Gulf of Venezuela (which leads to the 
Lake of Maracaibo). Colombia's resistance to the Venezuelan claim 
is due to the fact that a combination of historic title and the 
Colombian-Venezuelan boundary on the western side of the bay 
would give an extensive stretch of water (otherwise, in part, free 
high seas) and its fishery, exclusively to Venezuela.156 The rationale, 
accordingly, of paragraph 2 of the Colombian proposal would appear 
to have been drafted for the sole purpose of ensuring difficulty for 
Venezuela in establishing her historic title to th~ bay and guarantee-
ing that Colombia's consent would have to be bargained for. A 
similar rationale underlies the requirement of notification (in effect 
registration?). This would provide Colombia with international 
machinery whereby she could lodge a caveat _against any attempt, 
on the part of Venezuela, to establish the Gulf as an historic bay. 
154. Colombia, Draft Articles Concerning the Territorial Sea: Bays, the Coasts of Which 
Bel,ong to a Single Stare, Historic Bays or Other Historic Waters, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.91 
(1976), reprinted in v THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL 
RECORDS 202 (1976) [hereinafter cited as V UNCLOS III OFFICIAL RECORDS (1976)]. 
155. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/62 (1978), reprint,ed in VI THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 173 (1978) [hereinafter cited as VI UNCLOS III 
0FFCIAL RECORDS (1978). 
156. On the chronic discord between Colombia and Venezuela over the Gulf of Venezuela, 
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On the other hand, paragraph 2's restrictive principle of only 
permitting title to a historic bay to exist when (if two or more 
coastal states are involved) they both, or all, agree would appear 
to be in direct contradiction to the decision of the Central American 
Court of Justice in the Gulf of Fonseca Case.157 In that case the Cen-
tral American Court of Justice found that the Gulf of Fonseca (Gulf 
of Amapala or Conchagua) had been ·an historic bay jointly owned 
by the three littoral states (Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador) 
as successors of the Federal Republic of the Center of America and 
of the Crown of Castile (which had exercised sovereignty over the 
whole area of the bay from 1552 down to 1821 when the Federal 
Republic replaced it) as res communis, despite Nicaragua's individual 
attempt to part with, and dispose of, its share.158 
This disposition arose from the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty 
whereby Nicaragua granted to the United States rights to dig and 
operate an inter-oceanic canal from the Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean 
and to establish a naval base in the Bay for a period of 99 years. 
Protesting this agreement as a third party, El Salvador asserted 
that such a concession derogated from her right of condominium 
over the whole bay, while Nicaragua argued that only her separate 
and individually owned portion of the Gulf was affected-and of 
this she was entitled to dispose in full sovereignty .159 This separate 
share of the Bay, moreover, was outside any zone of El Salvador's 
interest, even though it was within the Gulf, because its historic 
waters were not jointly owned by the littoral states under a con-
dominium regime, but separately under regimes of individual owner-
ship and sovereignty. Nicaragua also pointed to the fact that she 
and El Salvador did not possess adjacent coasts (the coast of 
Honduras on the Gulf separated them) so that there could be no 
claim arising out of the adjacency of the proposed construction 
works. 
The judges of the Central American Court of Justice 
unanimously found that the Gulf constituted a "closed sea" and that 
it "belongs to three nations instead of one." It also found that 
Nicaragua was not able to dispose of any rights in the Gulf as "a 
thing possessed in common except jointly or with the consent of 
see Nweihed, EZ (Uneasy) Delimitation in the Semi-enclosed Caribbean Sea: Recent Agreements 
Between Venezuela and her Neighbors, 8 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 9-10 (1980). 
157. The Gulf of Fonseca, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 674 (1917). 
158. Id. at 693. 
159. Id. at 694. 
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all."160 Had the Colombian draft article's paragraph 2 reflected the 
international law of historic bays, Nicaragua's refusal to agree to 
the inalienably joint ownership of the Bay, as reflected in her dis-
position of her separate share of the bay the provision, would have 
been justified. The fact that Nicaragua's conduct was found to be 
invalid on the ground of the Bay's special status as a jointly and 
inalienably owned historic bay, points to the contradiction between 
that decision and paragraph 2 of the Colombian draft. 
Secondly, paragraph 2 of the Colombian draft is not clear 
whether such a bay as it contemplates should be held by the littoral 
states in common or separately when all agree thereto. Be that as 
it may, paragraph 2 of the Colombian draft article, which con-
templates historic title over a bay shared by two or more littoral 
states as only being legally valid if both or all of the littoral states 
(if there are more than two) have expressly agreed thereto, is con-
tradicted by both state practice and public international law. 
Indeed, the appraisal by Professors McDougal and Burke161 of 
the outcome, in terms of bays adjacent to two or more states, of 
the 1930 League of Nations Codification Conference, and of the 1958 
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference would seem to be equally 
applicable to the Third (197 4-82) Conference. They wrote: 
Unfortunately, all these [i.e. private or preparatory draft 
codification drafts and replies on this topic of governments to the 
Preparatory committee of the 1930 League Conference on the sub-
ject] indications of consensus are not reflected explicitly in the out-
come of the 1930 Conference, in the International Law Commis-
sion or in the 1958 Conference. The 1930 Conference did not con-
sider the question, the [International Law] Commission followed 
suit and the 1958 Convention article on bays is limited to those 
within a single state. Nevertheless all the prior indications of agree-
ment among states, coupled with refusal of subsequent official 
codification efforts to apply a provision similar to that evolved for 
bays within a single state, provide strong support for the position 
that the several states indented by a bay are not regarded as 
authorized jointly to claim these areas as internal waters as a single 
state could do in the same circumstances.162 
The authors did argue, however, that bays whose waters had 
been the subject of historic assertions provided an exception to the 
160. Id. at 728. 
161. McDouGAL & BURKE. THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962). 
162. Id. at 442-43. 
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rule of bays in general and they cited the Gulf of Fonseca Case as 
authority163 and pointed out that it also justified the "present-day 
expectation that one of several states may not unilaterally decide 
upon the use of waters over which the several possess authority 
in common because of historic rights."164 
Both the Gulf of Fonseca and the Gulf of Aqaba, 165 came into 
legal existence as enclosed seas when each of them was subjected 
to the sovereignty of a single imperial state and survived as a res 
communis (shared in community) amongst the plurality of successor 
states or, perhaps, owned by one of the successor states, as in the 
case of Palk's Bay and the Gulf of Manaar (these bays being under 
the sovereignty of Sri Lanka alone rather than as the community 
property of it and India 166). But, of course, these arms of the sea 
had been subject, exclusively, to the sovereignty of the ancient kings 
of the island since time immemorial. So, in a sense, the title of the 
present Republic of Sri Lanka does not so much stem from being 
a successor to the British Raj (and its predecessors, the Portugese 
and Dutch colonial empires) as from the revival of that ancient 
polity's earlier indigenous rights. 
C. THE PROPOSAL OF A DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR 
A third proposed definition, although brief, of historic bays at 
least enjoys the impartiality and relevance to a wide variety of 
phenomena which the Colombian draft appears to lack. That is 
Strohl's proposed formulation which is as follows: 
(b) A historic bay is an indentation whose waters are considered, 
in whole or in part, to be internal waters. The indentation is one 
having a genuine and long-standing economic link with the 
surrounding coast. The historic bay contains waters over which 
the coastal state or states have exercised a regime of internal 
waters for a period of long standing, with explicit or implicit 
recognition of such practice by foreign states.167 
This writer, however, does have reservations regarding the 
above. While the need for a genuine link is acceptable, the validity 
163. Id. at 443. 
164. Id. at 445. 
165. See Claim of October 2, 1957, by Saudi Arabia in the United Nations General 
Assembly, 12 U.N. GAOR (697th plen. mtg) at 233, U.N. Doc. A/3575 (1957). 
166. Fran~ois, Deuxieme Rapport Sur la Haute Mer, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/42, (1951) 2 Y.B. 
INT'L L. 94-95. 
167. M. STROHL. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BAYS 404-05 (1963). 
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of the definition's restriction to an economic (presumably including 
resource-winning) limitation is questioned. Delaware Bay first came 
under the exclusive and sovereign control of that young United 
States from the need to vindicate her neutrality. It is suggested 
that both Chesapeake and Delaware Bays testify to the fact that 
national security interests may, equally with economic interests and 
independently of them, provide the requisite "genuine link" with 
the land territory to establish an historic bay. In addition to 
economic and national security considerations, social, historical and 
political factors may also provide the necessary intimate relation-
ship between the sea area in question and the land. 
Secondly, resort to the term "genuine link" without some fur-
ther definition may arouse criticism. Some influential publicists, for 
example, have objected to its extension from the Nottebohm Case168 
(in which its absence was used to disqualify a grant of naturaliza-
tion from entitlement to international recognition) to the definition 
of the relationship of a state with a ship it permits to fly its flag 
in Article 5(1) of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas169 and Article 
91(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.110 
Thirdly, the requirement, in light of the Fisheries Case, for 
recognition is questionable. Surely if that case was correctly decided, 
acquiescence is enough?111 
D. A STRATEGIC WITHDRAWAL? 
Be these considerations as they may, many publicists and 
diplomats today agree with what Mr. Sikri, the representative of 
India at the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, said in 1958, namely that: 
[H]is county, which possessed two historic bays, was highly 
interested in the problem raised by the Panamanian delegation. 
He felt, however, that the Committee had neither the time nor the 
material available to deal with the matter properly. Each bay hav-
ing its own particular characteristics, a mass of data would have 
to be sifted and collated before any general principles could be 
established.112 
168. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guat.) (Second Phase) 1955 l.C.J. 4 (Judgment 
of Apr. 6). 
169. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. 
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter cited as Convention on the 
High Seas]. 
170. 1982 Convention, supra note 13, art. 91(1). 
171. See supra text of section III. 
172. Statement of Mr. Sikri (India), reprinted in III UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON 
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Things have not moved on, since 1958, from this concession 
to the raw facts of geography, history and the local politics of a 
region. Does this simply relegate the determination of whether a 
bay is historic or not to the relative power of the claiming and the 
negating state or states, or to their relative skills in negotiation? 
Has the law to remain helpless in the face of this lacuna? 
E. CODIFICATION OF HISTORIC RIGHTS: THE IMPOSSIBLE 
DREAM? 
The considerations may be concluded with two quotations from 
the late Charles de Visscher. The first related to length of time 
and publicity. He wrote: 
[I]n the maritime domain, where some types of state activity 
tending to create particular rights at the cost of the community 
of states may at times go on without precise knowledge on the 
part of interested governments or without placing them under any 
legal obligation to communicate their view. Precise criteria can 
hardly be formulated for judging the legal effect of abstention or 
silence which may in some cases be due to a passing lack of 
interest.173 
The second quotation from de Visscher's magisterial work 
relates to the issue of legal precision and the possibility of general 
definition. He pointed out: 
This consolidation [by "Historic Titles"] which may have prac-
tical importance for territories not yet finally organized under a 
state regime as well as certain stretches of sea, such as bays, is 
not subject to the conditions specifically required in other modes 
of acquiring territory. Proven long use, which is its foundation, 
merely represents a complex of interests and relations which in 
themselves have the effect of attaching a territory or an expanse 
of sea to a given state. It is these relations, varying from one case 
to another, and not the passage . of a fixed term, unknown in any 
event to international law, that are taken into direct account by 
the judge to decide in concreto on the existence or non-existence 
of a consolidation by historic titles.174 
XI. SOME QUESTIONS 
(1) With the development of new alternative concepts for the 
purpose of coastal states' exercise of control over many of the 
THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 74 (1958) .. 
173. DE VISSCHER, supra note 108, at 208. 
174. Id. at 209. 
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activities which traditionally may have lacked adequate bases in 
international law (other than extensions of the doctrine of historic 
bays or historic waters, for example the Exclusive Economic Zone, 
the Contiguous Zone, the Continental Shelf, the Air Defense 
Identification Zone and the Doctrine of Archipelagos), has the doc-
trine of historic bays and historic waters become obsolete? 
(2) What benefits does the doctrine confer on the international 
community and/or coastal states which are not conferred by the 
doctrines which extend coastal states' competences seawards and 
which are recognized in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea? 
(3) Are the provisions of Article 298 of the 1982 Convention 
adequate for settling disputes with respect to historic bays or 
historic waters? 
(4) In any future codification of the legal doctrine of historic 
waters including historic bays, should acceptance (as required in 
paragraph l(b) of the Colombian Draft Articles175 for the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea) provide the ruling 
criterion, or should the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case116 test of 
acquiescence be enough to establish a littoral state's sovereignty 
over an adjacent bay on historic grounds? 
(5) Despite obvious differences between the doctrines enun-
ciated, in the international arena, by the International Court of 
Justice, for example in the Fisheries Case, with regard to the 
substantive requirements for establishing rights to historic waters 
and the procedural issues of burden of proof, and those prescribed 
for the domestic scene within the United States by that Nation's 
Supreme Court, do the more stringent requirements of the later 
tribunal have a prospective utility as persuasive arguments for the 
future evolution of international law on the subject? 
(6) Are disputes with regard to the status of waters as historic 
bays difficult to resolve when two or more states front onto a bay, 
and only one or more (but not all) wish to characterize the waters 
of the bay as historic (whether in terms of community property or 
for their own individual claims of separate maritime areas)? 
(7) Is it predictable that the evolution of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone Doctrine, or the application of the Continental Shelf 
Doctrine, will eventually facilitate or exacerbate a common 
175. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25. 
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understanding amongst maritime nations as to the meaning, and 
as to the rights thereunder, of historic bays? Or render them 
obsolete? 
(8) Does a general doctrine of historic bays in international 
law have any future or should historic title be seen as arising under 
unique circumstances so that historic bays can have no common legal 
factors? 
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